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 Foreword  
This thesis was not supposed to be about global issues or wicked problems. It 
started from exploring how design thinking methods might be used in early 
childhood education – a long-lasting personal interest of mine. However, I soon 
realized that in order to truly make a change in the way we educate our children, 
we would have to reform our educational policies and guidelines. Getting into the 
way we come up with policies and laws, I understood these processes themselves 
needed to change to better serve our society. Diving into public policymaking, I 
began to see how fundamentally the way our public sector works lacks in 
mechanisms to guide our society towards a more sustainable future. 
 
Figure 0. The journey of this thesis 2011-2015. 
 
 
When at times doubting my abilities to finish this piece of work, what made me 
push through was a certain sense of urgency. I truly believe that understanding 
sustainability and our abilities to cope with huge systemic challenges are crucial in 
determining the fate of humanity as a whole, and with this thesis I hope to 
contribute to this discussion in Finland.  
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1     Introduction 
 
“The ability to make consistently good decisions over time, enabling an 
organization to adapt quickly to changes in its environment, has become a critical 
determinant of success.” 
 
— State Services Commission, New Zealand, 2000  
 
Governments today are under immense pressure to renew themselves and their 
policymaking procedures to better respond to the growing and increasingly 
complex challenges they face. The quote above well captures the dilemma of 
policymaking: on one hand, policy should be consistent over time — on the other, 
it should be able to not only adapt to changes but to proactively shape the future. 
(Doz & Kosonen 2014; Hämäläinen 2013; Loorbach 2007; Kemp et al. 2005; 
Head & Alford 2008)  
 
Socio-demographic trends and low economic growth question existing welfare 
state services. (OECD Public Governance Reviews 2010) In Finland, for 
example, government spending related to ageing has added up to almost half of 
the total growth in expenses during the last decade.1 Tax income is not enough to 
cover the costs of maintaining a welfare state as we know it, and the amount of 
national debt has rapidly increased since the economic downturn. At the same 
time, citizen demand for open, adaptive and transparent government is increasing, 
and new and cheaper technological solutions provide an efficient way of sharing 
real-time information and engaging the public in discussion. (Sørensen & Torfing 
2012) 
 
It is becoming clear that in order to cope with complexity, our ways of governance 
will need to change. The current ways of decision-making and the strategic 
management of our public sector are unable to successfully deal with these wicked 
issues of tomorrow. (Osborne 2007; Sørensen & Torfing 2012) 
                                               
1 Data source: Tilastokeskus, retreived 18.1.2014 
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As a response to this need, innovation in the public sector has risen to be a popular 
topic in the discussion of public management renewal. (Sørensen & Torfing 2012) 
Within the recent years, service design and design thinking as methodological 
approaches to routinely generating innovation have begun to gain their place in the 
discourse. They provide ways for governance to get engaged in a dialogue with the 
civil society and the private sector, and tools to better communicate the multiple 
angles of this complex environment we live in. Research strongly supports this 
pursuit by suggesting that citizen in general are more satisfied with their lives 
given the chance to take part in innovating services they will be using themselves. 
(Bason 2010; von Hippel 2005) In many countries, both local and central 
government agencies have indeed found ways to incorporate design capabilities 
into their operations: internal and external design agencies, design brokering 
services, and embedding designers into the organization. (The Design 
Commission 2013) 
 
The UK, Wales, Finland and Denmark have been especially active with their 
work on innovation and design policies, and many others are now taking their 
example. ‘Design for Government’ in Finland has especially been fortified by the 
2012 World Design Capital year and the growing amount of design projects in 
the public sector that have followed since (Kansainvälinen designsäätiö 2012). 
International organizations promoting the use of design methods in the public 
sector, such as Sharing Experience Europe (SEE) and the European Design 
Leadership Board, have been established. There is a growing global body of 
evidence to show that bringing in design tools and -thinking early in the process 
can have a significant impact on the consequences of an existing or future public 
service, (The SOLACE Foundation Imprint 2008; SEE Platform 2012; 
European Commission 2010) and in 2010, design was named as one of the ten 
priorities for innovation in the European Commission. 
 
However, current practices of innovation and design within the public sector can 
be characterized as accidental and episodic. Innovation occurs in relatively small 
scales and is highly dependent on the personal commitment and preferences of 
management. The nature of design activities within government is not systematic, 
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and design and innovation capabilities thus do not build inside the public sector to 
enhance government renewal in a larger scale. (SEE Platform 2013b) Despite 
national initiatives in building design and innovation capabilities in Finland (Työ- 
ja elinkeinoministeriö 2013), there is no master plan for renewing the ways of 
policymaking itself. There is a clear need for strategic approaches to innovation 
within the public sector. (Head & Alford 2008; Sørensen & Torfing 2012)  
 
The Public Sector Design Ladder (see Figure 1 below) by members of the SEE 
Platform is a three-step tool for assessing the degree to which design is applied in 
public sector organizations. (SEE Platform 2013a; SEE Platform 2013b) The 
same kind of thinking has earlier been applied to design capabilities in private 
sector companies: de Mozota & Kim (2009), for example, have studied the 
concept of design as a core competency. Their work argues that design can be 
seen as an important organizational asset in building sustained competitive 
advantage. This thesis suggests that in a similar way, design in the public sector 
should be considered as a way to not only create better outcomes of service design 
projects, but to generate new kinds of knowledge within the organization and in 
its strategic levels conversations. (de Mozota & Kim 2009) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The public sector design ladder. SEE Platform 2013b. 
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The first step of the ladder describes the most common situation in public sector 
organizations today, where design methods such as service design are recognized 
as important tools in solving problems. These discrete problems may be large and 
wicked, and the outcomes can have significant implications in the society. Projects 
are, however, often commissioned from outside or temporarily hired expertise, 
and thus no design capabilities build within the public organization itself. This 
means that each project is treated as a one-of-a-kind exploration, and design 
activities hardly have any effect on the framing or procurement of projects 
elsewhere in the organization. (SEE Platform 2013b) 
 
The second step of the ladder answers to this problem by recognizing the need to 
actively develop design capabilities within public management. Design thinking 
amongst many other techniques is easily accessible without a formal education in 
design. (Brown & Wyatt 2010) Philosophies such as gaining back creative 
confidence (Kelley & Kelley 2012) aim to encourage public sector employees to 
innovate without a fear of failure. A growing number of toolsets, introductory 
courses to design and collections of case studies has emerged. In Finland, some of 
these include the events, guidance and case studies generated by Design Driven 
City2 and the extensive toolbox for citizen-driven service design by the 
Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities (Kuntaliitto 2014). Many 
others have also compiled their own channels of sharing design tools and 
experiences. 
 
In the third step of the ladder, design for policy, design thinking is used by 
policymakers and often facilitated by designers. This field is still relatively 
unexplored in both academia and practice, but the logic, according to SEE 
Platform (2013b), is clear. Design methods can answer to some of the key issues 
identified in policymaking today, providing methods of low-cost rapid 
prototyping and testing solutions, engaging people across organizations, and 
thinking in systems, among others. Design for policy aims to utilize these skills to 
the benefit of overcoming problems typical to the public sector: fragmentation of 
operations into silos, slow processes and high-cost pilots. (SEE Platform 2013b) 
                                               
2 www.toimivakaupunki.fi/en/ 
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This third level of embedding design into public policymaking is here called 
strategic design, following Helsinki Design Lab (HDL) (Boyer et al. 2011). The 
field, as HDL describes it, is about “-- shaping decisions, framing challenges, 
defining opportunities, and stewardship”. While the methods and tools that strategic 
designers use are adapted from many established fields of science, such as systems 
thinking, social sciences or anthropology, the emergence of a profession aimed 
particularly to create disruptive change within the public policymaking system is 
rather unique. 
 
Though strategic design is a trendy term among practitioners, the lack of 
academic research on the particular term in relation to public governance makes it 
difficult to straightforwardly validate the phenomenon as significant in the 
conversation on public sector strategy making. There is, however, a more 
established discussion of the theme within the private sector and in management 
sciences. Seidel (2000) wrote of design-led consultancy as a way to shape the 
strategies of companies, Stevens & Moultrie (2011) have claimed design thinking 
may significantly contribute to the strategy formulation process, and Best (2011) 
further elaborated on the value of design in generating new insights on emergent 
possibilities. 
 
The field of management theory has long talked of strategic thinking as the enabler 
of successful strategy formulation and implementation. The attributes connected 
to strategic thinking in literature are highly similar to those of a strategic designer. 
(Liedtka 1998; Boyer et al. 2011; Best 2011; Stevens & Moultrie 2011) What the 
design field and designers may bring as new to this discussion, are for example 
skills of visualization and communication, user-centered methods and 
stewardship, meaning the rapid feedback loops and learning achieved by doing, 
not only thinking. (Boyer et al. 2011; Boyer et al. 2013) This proposed connection 
of design methods and strategy making is further elaborated on later in this study. 
 
This thesis is particularly interested in the structural innovations within 
policymaking itself. With the search for ways to generate change within the 
governance system, embedding strategic design and innovation agendas in the 
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highest levels of policymaking is an important step. (European Commission 2010) 
Transition management is one approach aiming to achieve this, and to guide large 
systems continuously towards sustainability. Despite the term it is less about 
management and more about creating the right conditions for structural 
innovation to occur. Transition management can be seen to happen, much like 
the design ladder, on three levels: strategic, tactical and operational. 
(Timmermans 2006; Kemp et al. 2005) Out of these, my interests lie within the 
strategic level and particularly in the mechanisms of creating strategic intent. This 
cohesive intent can be described as the driving force behind all innovation actions: 
it offers the answers to why a system should exist in the first place and what the 
shared goals that it pursues are (Hamel & Prahalad 1989; Liedtka 1998; Mantere 
& Sillince 2007).  
 
These themes will be further elaborated on in the context review of this study. 
Next, I will shortly introduce the current decision-making arena of national 
strategy within the public sector of Finland. 
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The arena of building strategy for Finland 
The current arena of forming strategy for Finland as a nation is the political 
context of government formation talks, occurring every four years in conjunction 
with the parliamentary elections. The winning party of elections appoints a 
negotiator to form the next Cabinet, and in practice, he or she becomes the Prime 
Minister once the Cabinet is appointed. During these negotiations, the political 
parties involved in discussion aim to find consensus on the priorities of action 
during their term of office. This consensus forms the next Government 
Programme, which the appointed Cabinet will then pursue. 
 
This highly political nature of strategy making combined with the relatively short 
cycles of governance has lately been seen to lead to a tactical game plan rather 
than a strategic long-term discussion on the future of Finland (OHRA Project 
Group 2014). There is, however, no other arena that would have the position of 
power to enforce long-term visions for the whole of government. On this basis, I 
make the claim that the Cabinet of Finland should be responsible for initiating 
strategic discourse and building coherent strategic intent with all the actors 
involved in the network of developing the public sector. 
 
These problematic notions have not gone unnoticed within the government itself. 
In January 2015, OHRA Project steered by the Prime Minister’s Office published 
a number of proposals considering the Government’s steering program and its 
renewal. These suggestions included a shift to the Government Programme as a 
clearly strategic outline of long-term broad goals, and the addition of a separate 
Government Action Plan containing detailed means and tools for 
implementation. The project presented critique of recent Governments for having 
too many and too detailed objectives. Reforms have been poorly planned, and the 
details of implementation too early locked in for the whole of the term of office. 
(OHRA Project Group 2014)  
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Unlike in some countries, the administration in Finland does not follow political 
cycles. Still, it is naturally affected by the decisions made in higher levels of 
policymaking (see Figure 2 below for the public administration structure of 
Finland). The somewhat confusing nature of Government Programmes has left 
civil servants without a clear mutual understanding on the primary objectives of 
the government. On the other hand, the expertise of administrative personnel has 
not been utilized in planning the pursuit of these goals, as very detailed plans for 
implementation have already been included in the Government Programmes in 
the beginning of term. (OHRA Project Group 2014) 
 
 
Figure 2: The structure of public administration in Finland.  
www.suomi.fi, retrieved 3.4.2015. 
 
The empirical study of this thesis aims to examine the discursive logic by which 
the Government Programmes of Finland have recently answered to the need of 
building strategic intent. As responsible for generating the highest level of 
common strategy for Finland, the ways in which government formation talks and 
the Government Programmes as their end result are built and communicated is 
especially important in the pursuit of sustainable strategies.  
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1.1     Research objectives and questions  
This thesis aims to explore the current state of abilities in our public government 
to produce strategic intent, in order to pursue a sustainable future. By first 
defining the preconditions for sustainable strategy making through introducing 
transition management, and then examining how well these conditions are met, I 
hope to raise discussion on the need for change within the public decision-making 
system itself. 
 
Due to the complex and vague field of transition management and strategic intent 
within the field of policymaking, this thesis explores existing literature and 
knowledge with perhaps a more wide perspective than usually necessary. An 
important objective for this study is, however, to learn to understand the complex 
nature of innovation in public policymaking and to channel this complexity for 
the reader as well. Through the elaborate context review, I also hope to establish a 
solid ground for my central argument of the necessity of building strategic intent 
as part of policymaking. 
 
The research questions of this thesis can be summarized as follows:  
 
1. Why is building strategic intent relevant for policymaking? 
2. What are the key discourses of building strategic intent? 
3. How are these discourses constructed within the Government 
Programmes of Finland? 
 
These questions will first be addressed with an overview on existing literature and 
knowledge. In the spirit of breaking silos, this study combines research from 
multiple different academic disciplines. IDBM being an interdisciplinary study 
program, I believe a truly multidisciplinary approach may shed light on issues that 
might otherwise be left overlooked in between the ‘territories’ of academia. 
 
Since the very nature of wickedity is having no generic answers to suit all of the 
vastly different challenges, this thesis explores the approach of transition 
management to tackling wicked problems instead. By defining the key enablers of 
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dealing with wicked problems, I hope to contribute on my part to the discussion 
of building a public policymaking system better equipped to taking on these huge 
challenges.  
 
Design thinking, service design and strategic design have been popular topics 
within the public sector in the recent years. There seems to be a rather cohesive 
view within the design education field of Finland on the need for design services 
in the public sector. This thesis aims to provide another viewpoint into this 
discussion by searching for some reasons why the public sector itself might 
proactively want to adopt this thought of designers being involved in the 
policymaking process on its strategic level.  
 
1.2     Definitions 
Innovation: Following the definition of Bland et al. (2010), innovation in this 
study is understood as both an iterative process and an outcome. It includes the 
ideation, acceptance and implementation of a new idea or approach within the 
social context, and challenges the prevailing way of things.  Given the context of 
public policymaking in this study, innovation is also seen to create public value. 
 
Transition: Timmermans (2006) describes transitions as “structural innovations of 
societal systems, in reaction to wicked problems threatening development”. 
Transitions here are understood as radical shifts in a system’s way of seeing and 
doing. 
  
Governance and government: Governance here is understood as all the processes of 
governing, regardless of who initiates these actions. Often this actor is the 
government, which in this study is mostly used to describe the formal body of 
authority on the national level.  
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1.3     Structure of the study 
The study begins by introducing the methodology and research methods used in 
this thesis. The topic being so complex and hard to grasp, the thesis then rather 
broadly explores the concepts of sustainable development and wicked problems 
before getting into transition management as a way for policymaking to answer to 
these challenges. The final chapter of context review has a sharper focus on the 
strategic level of transition management and on building strategic intent in 
particular.  
 
The first two chapters of context review will answer to the first research question 
of the necessity of building strategic intent in the public sector. The third chapter 
of context review will then define the ways of constructing strategic intent 
through discourse, answering to the second research question. Empirical research 
consists of two methods used. An online questionnaire will support the validity of 
building strategic intent in the Finnish public sector, and critical discourse analysis 
will then look at Government Programmes in Finland to examine the state of 
strategy making within the highest levels of our government, thus finding answers 
to the last research question.  
 
The main empirical study consists of a rhetorical analysis of government programs 
within the past three decades — the lifetime of one generation, which is the 
minimum timeframe a societal transition takes to develop (Rotmans et al. 2001; 
Kemp et al. 2005). The method of critical discourse analysis was chosen, because 
strategic intent can be seen first and foremost as a rhetorical device for creating a 
coherent narrative of the desired future to aim for (Mantere & Sillince 2007). 
This basis of the empirical study will be further explained in the next chapter. 
 
Finally, the research findings will be concluded and discussed in relation to the 
empirical framework and its implications to public sector management and 
policymaking.  
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2     Methodology 
This chapter will first set the methodological base for this study and assess its 
reliability and validity. To conclude the chapter, the selected research methods of 
online questionnaire and critical discourse analysis are explained in more detail. 
 
2.1     Research methodology 
The research consists of two parts: a broad context review looks at the theoretical 
side of pursuing and creating strategic intent, while the empirical study examines 
these principles of theory in practice within the governance of Finland. The 
empirical part is built on the basis of methodological triangulation: the selection of 
more than one research method, looking at the same issue from different angles. 
Its purpose is to increase the validity and reliability of studies, and it is commonly 
used in qualitative inquiries where the affirmation of research results is not so 
straightforward as often in quantitative methods (Given 2008). This study aims to 
confirm my central hypothesis of the necessity of building strategic intent in the 
policymaking arena of Finland by combining the methods of an online 
questionnaire and critical discourse analysis. The use of multiple methods also 
adds to the overall richness of research and analysis, providing a more varied set of 
data to base my findings on. 
 
Despite the fact that this utilization of triangulation can be seen to mimic the 
nature of quantitative methods, where research is on the search for “one truth”, 
this study clearly positions itself in the realm of interpretive inquiries and 
recognizes the complexity of environments. (Given 2008) The key distinguishing 
factor between these two approaches is the probing and explorative nature of 
methods used in qualitative research: they aim not to provide a certain definitive 
statement, but to explore multiple possible explanations to questions. The nature 
of qualitative research is cyclical and the research phase cannot be completely 
separated from the analysis and interpretation of findings. This shows accordingly 
in the way I treat the findings of my research in the sixth and seventh chapters of 
this thesis, where they are simultaneously introduced and interpreted. 
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Complexity sciences, with which this thesis on a philosophical level affiliates, are 
rather new theories and have no well-established research methodology. 
Interpretive inquiry as an approach of study, however, fits their ontological and 
epistemological (“What is reality?” and “How do I know this is reality?”) 
positioning. Complexity sciences suggest that these questions of what is on the 
outside and how we interpret it from within are inseparable. Our reality and the 
knowledge of it are seen to co-evolve, and implementing theories to practice can 
actually change the reality we experience in a social context. (Allen & Varga 2007; 
Given 2008) Inquiry requires dialogue, which then needs to be interpreted in a 
mutual act between the researcher and the context (Given 2008). My selection of 
critical discourse analysis as the method for the main empirical study well 
complements this idea of generating new knowledge in the dialogue between the 
text and its reader. The method itself stems from the same ontology of critical 
realism than complexity sciences, and will be further introduced at the end of this 
chapter. 
 
Some critical theories radically suggest that the concepts of validity and reliability 
are irrelevant in relation to the sense-making activities of qualitative research. 
They claim that these processes of generating new understanding are always 
relative constructions, and thus the validity or reliability of them cannot be 
objectively assessed. (Given 2008) More moderate viewpoints suggest that the 
validity and reliability of qualitative research may be improved by methods such as 
triangulation, which I have utilized within this study. These two research methods 
of online questionnaire and critical discourse analysis will now be introduced in 
the following subchapters. 
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2.2     Online questionnaire 
The aim of the online survey was to validate my key hypothesis of the lack of 
strategic intent in Finnish governance being an important issue we should address. 
To investigate if this in fact was the case, I followed the viewpoint of Mantere & 
Sillince (2008) on the rhetoric qualities of strategic intent, disassembling the 
concept into two main areas of research: its capacity of creating a shared sense of 
purpose within the organization, and the sense of continuity in actions it creates. 
These different functions of strategic intent will be discussed in more detail in the 
final part of context review.  
 
To find out how public sector employees felt about their work community in 
relation to these two research areas, I broke down the topics to more detailed 
survey questions. For example, the question of shared purpose was addressed with 
statements like: “I understand my own role in reaching the goals of my work 
community”, “I am able to affect the shared goals of my work community”, “Some 
members of my work community pursue their own agendas instead of our common goals” 
and “I find my work meaningful”. I addressed the question of continuity in actions 
by statements such as: “My work is guided by conflicting instructions” and “My work 
community learns from failure”. All the statements can be viewed in Appendix 1a.  
 
The survey questions were presented as positive or negative claims. Respondents 
were asked to assess the statements on a 7-point Likert scale, 0 being “I strongly 
disagree”, 4 standing for “I do not agree or disagree” and 7 being “I strongly 
agree”. Empirical research has shown that respondents are more likely to choose a 
negative than a positive alternative when the midpoint option is eliminated from 
the alternatives. This so-called social desirability bias arises as respondents aim to 
answer in a socially accepted manner, and use self-censorship in limiting their 
negative answers. (Garland 1991) The midpoint option was, however, offered and 
quite actively selected in the responses of this survey.  
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Distributing the survey  
As the intention of this survey was not to gain a comprehensive or generalizable 
estimate of the opinions of all public sector employees, I used the method of 
convenience sampling in distributing the survey. Convenience sampling is often 
used in this kind of preliminary research, where the intent is to gain a rough 
estimate of the subject with low costs and in a rapid manner (Boslaugh & McNutt 
2008). As respondents were also asked to distribute the survey to some of their 
colleagues, the method of snowball sampling is assumed to also have occurred. 
 
The survey was distributed mainly through two Facebook groups: Muotoiluagentit, 
an open group for municipal public sector employees in Finland interested in the 
use of design, and Virkamiesten vapaa verkosto, also an open group with the agenda 
of renewing public governance. I also e-mailed the questionnaire to some public 
sector employees I had met personally or otherwise knew were active in taking 
part in the discussion of renewing policymaking, and thus willing to voluntarily 
take part in the survey.  
 
I am well aware of the bias that this method of selection might have caused in the 
answers: it is likely that most respondents already had an interest in renewing 
public policies, and may have responded in a more critical manner than those who 
have no particular or personal interest in improving the ways of policymaking. On 
the other hand, a great deal of respondents is likely to have been situated in 
managerial positions (top or mid-management) rather than implementing policies 
at the grass-root level. This emphasis of managerial opinions may have caused a 
bias towards positive answers in questions regarding the possibility to influence 
common goals or instructions in the work place. 
 
Slight differences in the translations’ nuances may also occur, as the questionnaire 
was distributed in Finnish. However, the issues presented in the research findings 
rose clearly above others, and may thus be regarded a rather valid representation of 
the problems evident in public sector work communities in Finland. 
 
16 
2.3     Critical discourse analysis 
The second part of empirical research was carried out using critical discourse 
analysis (CDA). It is a well-established and cross-disciplinary approach to the 
study of discourse. It sees language as a way to socially construct the reality around 
us: stemming from the practice theory, it complements the viewpoint of this thesis 
on strategy making as social practice. CDA is a commonly used method for 
analyzing text in organizational studies and social sciences. (Chouliaraki & 
Fairclough 2010; Leitch & Palmer 2010) 
 
Fairclough (2005), one of the pioneers in the field of CDA, sets the methodology 
in the context of certain ontological questions and the viewpoint of critical realism, 
arguing that the natural and social worlds differ in the sense that the latter is 
constructed by human action. People’s concepts and views of this world we live in 
constantly reproduce and transform the perceived reality. Social agreements and 
phenomena are socially constructed in discourse, and discourse in turn is 
constructed by other agreements and phenomena. (Fairclough 2005; Leitch & 
Palmer 2010; Given 2008) Strategic texts and discourse are also seen to have 
textual agency: the ability to construct reality by actively contributing to 
organizational practices. (Vaara et al. 2010) 
 
The basic assumption of wicked problems, as we will further explore in the 
context review, is that these social messes are always situated within human 
discourse and behavior. (Rittel & Webber 1973) CDA thus can be seen a suitable 
methodology for examining the social construction of the intents of our society 
through strategic discourse in the form of Government Programmes. 
 
It is important to distinguish this approach from epistemological questions of 
judgmental relativism, where every representation of the world is viewed as 
equally good. Critical realism searches for ways to determine if some viewpoints 
actually construct a better representation of reality than others. (Fairclough 2005) 
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What builds to the critical nature of CDA as a methodology is its deep interests 
in the relations of power and the discursive practices they have internalized, and the 
rectification of power distributed in an unjust manner. (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 
2010) Discourse is seen to constitute these social relations of power, which 
through action become institutionalized. CDA also aims to expose assumptions 
that are taken for granted in these discourses of social, political and economical 
power. (Vaara et al. 2010) This provides an interesting setting for the study of 
Government Programmes, for which the tone of voice is clearly political by 
nature. 
 
CDA is interested in the macro-level affects of texts, but the analysis itself 
happens on the micro-level of discourse and social practices (Leitch & Palmer 
2010): the texts are studied within their context, not as separate entities. Context, 
by the definition of Chouliaraki & Fairclough (2010), is seen as an analytical 
construct that emerges within specific research questions. Consequently, most of 
CDA research is qualitative in-depth research, and quantitative methods are rarely 
used other than in a supportive role.  This also implies that the framing of 
research and thus the researcher herself has a crucial role in defining its outcomes. 
(Chouliaraki & Fairclough 2010; Fairclough 2005)  
 
The Government Programmes as a source of material 
The Government Programmes of Finland were an obvious choice for my main 
source of material, as these documents are the only format in which the strategic 
guidelines of Finland as a nation are publicly discussed in sufficient scope: in the 
context of nation-wide goals and actions.  The introductory chapter to this thesis 
already explained the broader context in which these documents are produced and 
consumed. Government Programmes are freely available for anyone on the 
website of the Finnish Government, which adds to the visibility of my actions in 
interpreting them: anyone can gain access to the material, and reproduce the study 
if they wish.  
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I decided to set the temporal framing of this study to the Government 
Programmes from the past 25 years (see Table 1 on the next page), as this 
timeframe is commonly considered the equivalent of one generation. Transitions, 
as will be introduced later in the study, typically need at least a generation to reach 
new equilibrium (Kemp & Loorbach 2002), and thus a shorter timeframe did not 
seem suitable. A scope this large, however, sets certain restrictions on how in-
depth the analysis can go. Therefore the first round of research, as illustrated in 
the next part, was restricted to the four key discourses of building strategic intent. 
The analysis combined both a grounded theory approach, where the framework 
arises through the analysis of research material, and a traditional positivist 
research methodology, which aims to investigate the application of a pre-
determined framework on the material (Given 2008). This allowed for the 
selection of a relatively large pool of material, while also getting deeper into the 
pre-determined discourses. 
 
On the other hand, my main interest lies in the approach of our current and future 
decision-makers and their abilities to enhance the birth of strategic intent today 
and in the future. Most members of the committees preparing and producing 
Government Programmes are, however, politicians with a long career in politics 
and experience from one or several past rounds of government formation talks. In 
this setting, also the intertextual examination of Government Programmes in 
relation to previous texts is interesting: has the group of politicians involved in the 
highest level of decision-making gained learnings from previous rounds of 
government formation, and is this visible in the discourses? 
 
As the timing of this study coincided with the parliamentary elections and 
therefore with the formation of a new Government Programme, I would have 
wished to also include the newest material into research. The Programme was, 
however, published only days before the completion of this study, so it could not 
be included in an in-depth analysis. Some important notions of the Government 
Programme of Prime Minister Sipilä are, however, included in this analysis. 
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Prime Minister(s)     Year(s) of Government Programme 
Sipilä       2015 
Katainen — Stubb      2011 and 2014 
Vanhanen II — Kiviniemi      2007 and 2010 
Jäätteenmäki — Vanhanen I       2003 
Lipponen II       1999 
Lipponen I       1995 
Aho       1991 
Holkeri       1987 
 
 
Table 1: The Government Programmes included in this study. 
 
Some of the Government Programmes were treated together, as the first 
government of Prime Minister Vanhanen and those of Kiviniemi and Stubb all 
begun in atypical conditions in the middle of the previous electoral term. These 
Government Programmes mostly repeated the goals of previous documents, and 
the few additions to these programmes were taken into account in the analysis.  
 
Within this study from now on, referring to “all Government Programmes” is to 
be understood as referring to all the Government Programmes examined here and 
listed in Table 1 above. 
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The research process  
The process of critical discourse analysis, according to Fairclough (2005) and 
Chouliaraki & Fairclough (2010), proceeds in the following order:  
 
1. The choice of research problem 
2. Formulation of research questions 
3. Choice of material 
4. Analysis 
a. Discursive practice 
b. Text 
c. Social practice 
5. Results 
 
 The choice of research problem and setting the research questions were presented 
in the beginning of this thesis: my aim is to explore how the key discourses 
identified in relation to building strategic intent are present in the Government 
Programmes. The choice of material was explained in the introduction and in the 
previous parts of this chapter. Government Programmes are the only consistently 
produced, publicly available material on the strategic level and long-term steering 
of Finland as a nation. 
 
The phases of analysis follow Fairclough’s (1992, cited in Jorgensen & Phillips, 
2002) framework on the three dimensions of critical analysis. This approach is 
illustrated in Figure 3 on the next page. He suggests that every instance of the use 
of language is simultaneously a text (e.g. speech, writing or visual image), a 
discursive practice, which involves the production and consumption of text, and a 
social practice to which the communicative event belongs. 
 
This study takes all three dimensions of analysis into account, but in terms of my 
framing of analysis on the four discourses of building strategic intent, the results 
are presented in the order of these strategic streams of discourse — not according 
to the level of discourse.  
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Figure 3: The three-dimensional model of critical discourse analysis.  
Fairclough 1992, cited in Jorgensen & Phillips 2002. 
 
The first phase of analysis in my study was reading through the rather large 
material base of these seven Government Programmes, a total of approximately 
250 pages. Through this preliminary reading, the overall style and tone of the 
documents was examined. I also identified the main ways in which the key 
discourses of building strategic intent were present in the documents, and noticed 
some additional relevant recurring discourses. The second round of analysis then 
concentrated on the more thorough inspection of these initial findings within the 
text. These findings are presented in the seventh chapter if this thesis, 
simultaneously with their analysis and interpretation. 
 
The following part will now dive into the context review of this study, and further 
introduce the concepts of wickedity, structural innovation and strategy as 
discourse. 
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CONTEXT REVIEW 
3     A world of wicked problems 
 
“Something new is happening, and those who excelled in the former paradigm are 
no longer succeeding as they once did. In place of prediction and control, we seem to 
have nothing but chaos; in place of individual efforts, the problem-solving process 
is now clearly social; in place of basing decisions on facts, we base them on stories 
that give us a more coherent sense of meaning. In place of finding the ‘right 
answer’, we seek to gain a shared understanding of possible solutions.” 
— Jeff Conklin, 2009 
 
Societies today are overwhelmed by problems that seem impossible to solve with 
our current approaches: social and economic inequality, loss of biodiversity, 
starvation and fatal epidemics to name a few. (Loorbach 2007; Beinecke 2009; 
Hämäläinen 2013) Our governments are ill equipped for dealing with these issues. 
The public sector is built to mainly produce standardized services in a top-to-
bottom manner, not to proactively pursue new innovative approaches. (Burns et 
al. 2006; Murray et al. 2010) 
 
The answer to tackling these problems, as this thesis will further explain, starts 
with our ability to recognize wickedness where we see it. Acknowledging the 
interconnectedness and complicated social conditions of problems is critical in 
creating new approaches to unwinding them. (Senge 1997; Loorbach 2007; 
Vandenbroeck 2012)  
 
Complex, global and intertwined challenges often come up when talking of 
sustainable development. Wicked problems and questions of sustainability are 
closely linked together, and by studying the nature of wickedity, we can learn to 
better answer to these sustainability issues on both local and global levels. 
(Loorbach 2007) This chapter will first briefly describe how sustainable 
development can be seen as a driver of change, and then take us through existing 
research on wicked problems. 
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3.1     Nurturing our common future 
 
“Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” 
 
— The World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987 
 
The above definition of sustainable development was presented in the United 
Nations’ report ‘Our Common Future’, and expanded upon in their Millennium 
Declaration in 2000. In thirty years, the foundation has not changed, but the 
public emphasis of these needs has strongly focused on economical wellbeing, 
having for long left social and environmental needs to less public attention. 
(Hämäläinen 2013; Loorbach 2007; Beinecke 2009; Adams 2006)  
 
Sustainability as a field of study is relatively young, its foundational texts dating 
back to the 1960s and 1970s. Despite the short academic history of solving 
sustainability issues, there is no single prevailing approach to the topic. The nature 
of these concerns is problematic in itself, as sustainability stems across multiple 
distinct disciplines. Economists, sociologists, biologists and engineers, for 
example, have each their own approaches to the field but tend to mostly keep 
within their silos of research. Though there is growing understanding of the many 
ways our life is interconnected, the common approach still sees challenges 
narrowly as mainly economic or ecological or social. We rarely recognize that 
resolutions lie, more often than not, in a complementary approach. (Loorbach 
2007; Strange & Bayley 2008) 
 
How can we make a change for the better? Many institutions and researchers have 
defined the building blocks of a sustainable future. There seems to be a general 
agreement that sustainability consists of three main dimensions: the economic, 
ecological and social foundations of life. Figure 4 on the next page illustrates one 
such approach to sustainability, as seen by The Finnish Innovation Fund Sitra 
(Hämäläinen 2013). 
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Figure 4: The building blocks of a sustainable future. Hämäläinen 2013. 
 
Natural environment, pictured at the bottom of the pyramid, provides both the 
base and the boundary conditions to all human activities. Ecological sustainability 
thus means building a future that does not exceed the carrying capacity of our 
planet, but rather nurtures these foundations. The ultimate aim is to create 
sustainable wellbeing, achieved through actions of the economy, public 
administration and the civil society. (Hämäläinen 2013) 
 
However, the different aspects of sustainability contain contradicting and even 
conflicting interests. A fundamental issue is that economic growth commonly 
occurs hand-in-hand with ecological decline, and yet there seems to be a need for 
growth in order to wipe out poverty. Our governments and businesses most often 
act as if trade-offs between the different aspects of sustainability were possible, but 
they are not. The economy is created by societies as a mechanism of exchanging 
goods and value. Human does not create our ecological environment, it thus 
providing a finite limit to our activities on the planet. (Adams 2006; McKenzie 
2004; Strange & Bayley 2008; Meadows et al. 1972) 
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The public sector and sustainability 
This thesis concentrates on the role of the public sector in the pursuit of 
sustainable wellbeing. Sustainability is seen here as a continuous process, not any 
reachable end state. Transitions towards sustainability occur as the result of 
multiple different but connected developments over a long period of time (Kemp 
et al. 2005; Kemp & Loorbach 2002), as we will later discuss in relation to 
transition management. 
 
The role of the public sector is central in the pursuit of sustainability (Strange & 
Bayley 2008; OECD Public Governance Reviews 2010), as every decision it 
makes can shape the ways in which the private sector and the civil society act. 
(Birney et al. 2010) It has a vast set of mechanisms available to direct the actions 
of our societies as a whole (Michie, van Stralen, et al. 2011). This powerful 
position of public policymaking also sets a significant responsibility to decision-
makers in the public sector: their actions can also take our societies further away 
from some aspects of sustainability, even impairing the wellbeing of citizen and 
the environment. Some critics state that this has for long been the state of our 
policymaking systems: that governments have hindered rather than promoted 
sustainable choices (Grindle & Hilderbrand 1995). 
 
Though the topic has now gained a foothold in discussion, not nearly all of public 
management can yet take into account all the different aspects of sustainability. 
Responsibility has been divided between separate ministries and other 
organizations: in Finland, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health develops 
services and policy aiming for social sustainability, while the Ministry of 
Environment cares for environmental sustainability issues, to put it crudely. 
Lining up policies, strategies and resources across organizational boundaries to 
produce sustainable outcomes is a challenging task, and still rarely achieved. 
(Birney et al. 2010) More important than any individual decisions are in this 
relation the ways in which our policymaking itself is organized: are we able to 
pursue a mutual goal of a sustainable future?  
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3.2     Seeing wicked problems 
 
“The adjective ‘wicked’ is supposed to describe the mischievous and even evil 
quality of these problems, where proposed ‘solutions’ often turn out to be worse than 
the symptoms.” 
– C. West Churchman, 1967 
 
As we just explored in connection to sustainable development, dealing with 
complexity is the word of today. The discussion of complex or ‘messy’ problems 
started in the late 60’s, but has gained attention of the mainstream only within the 
past couple of decades. Rittel and Webber (1973) formulated the term ‘wicked’ (as 
opposed to ‘tame’) to describe social policy problems for which there are no 
specific answers to. Ackoff (1974) at the same time spoke of ‘messes’ — complex 
issues unable to be solved by traditional methods. Levin et al. (2012) later 
established ‘super wicked’ problems as their own term, in response to the growing 
number of issues recognized in every field of science and policymaking to fulfill 
the criteria of wickedity. (Türke 2008; Rittel & Webber 1973; Levin et al. 2012) 
 
Recognizing the wicked nature of most real-world problems is important, as the 
mechanisms for dealing with and continuously resolving these issues differ vastly 
from what ‘traditional’ problem-solving skills we have been taught. (Jentoft & 
Chuenpagdee 2009; McGregor 2012; Churchman 1967; Rittel & Webber 1973; 
Ritchey 2013; Beinecke 2009; Vandenbroeck 2012; Levin et al. 2012; Jordan et al. 
2014) As a popular quote credited to Albert Einstein goes: “We cannot solve 
problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them.” 
 
The rest of this chapter will describe the common nature of wicked problems, and 
the next chapter will shed light on approaches to tackling them. 
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3.2.1     Recognizing wickedity 
Our dominant way of teaching and rehearsing problem-solving skills today is still 
largely based on 18th century beliefs. (Jordan et al. 2014) The ‘scientific’ or 
‘mathematical’ method assumes that given accurate information of the present, we 
can predict precise future outcomes (Rittel & Webber 1973). Looking for a single 
best way to resolve a situation, or several best practices as often described in 
management literature, illustrates our human need to make sense of things in this 
complex world. The truth is, however, that there are no right or wrong solutions 
for most of the real-world problems we face: only ones that can be seen as worse 
or better. The wicked nature of these issues is that we cannot understand the 
problem before we have developed a solution — and even then, we have created a 
dozen more issues to be solved. (Beinecke 2009; Rittel & Webber 1973; Levin et 
al. 2012; Bettencourt & Brelsford 2015) 
 
Wicked issues do not have a clearly defined problem statement (Ritchey 2013; 
Rittel & Webber 1973). Their properties are, thus, very different from any 
homework assignment in school or project brief in most work places. They are 
subjective: every person looking at the problem will define it differently, according 
to their own experiences, education and state of involvement (Rittel & Webber 
1973; Vandenbroeck 2012). That is why these problems cannot be solved once 
and for all, but they tend to reappear in different settings (Jentoft & Chuenpagdee 
2009; Rittel & Webber 1973). Frustrating as it may feel, we simply cannot fix 
them, but have to find ways of continuously dealing with them. 
 
Rittel and Webber’s (1973) article specified ten characteristics of wicked 
problems. This list (see Table 1 on the next page) has set the ground for all later 
academic discussion, and it captures well most aspects of wickedity. Researchers 
since have emphasized some properties over others or bound several characteristics 
together, but the general essence of wicked problems seems to be rather widely 
agreed upon. 
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Property Explanation 
There is no definite 
formulation of a wicked 
problem. 
Problems are ill-structured and contain multiple interlocking 
issues and constrains. Each definition is subjective and 
subject to change. 
There is no stopping rule. 
Since there is no single definition of the problem, there cannot 
be a definitive solution. The problem-solving process does not 
end, as there is no optimal solution to reach. 
Solutions are not true or 
false, but better or worse. 
The determination of a solution’s quality is not possible by 
objective measures. Solutions are merely good enough or not. 
There is no immediate and 
ultimate test for a solution. 
The full consequences of a solution cannot be traced. The 
effects of any action will continue over a virtually unlimited 
period of time. 
Every solution is a one-
shot operation. 
Every action has consequences. While developing solutions for 
wicked problems, all attempts to interfere will also change the 
nature of the problem. 
There is no way to identify 
all possible solutions. 
All possible solutions can never be thought of. There will 
always be unexplored opportunities. 
Every problem is unique. Despite the many similarities multiple problems may have, there is always some important property to distinguish them. 
Every problem can be 
considered a symptom of 
another problem. 
A problem can always be redefined as a symptom of some 
higher-level problem. The level of definition will affect the 
possible outcomes of providing solutions. 
The choice of explanation 
of the causes determines 
the nature of the solution. 
People tend to choose explanations most amicable to their 
solutions: conforming to the set of actions available for them. 
The planner has no right  
to be wrong. 
Wicked problems cannot be solved in a laboratory, separate 
from people’s lives. The planner is responsible for all 
consequences of the actions they take. 
Table 2: Characteristics of wicked problems. Adapted from Rittel & Webber 1973  
and Vandenbroeck 2012. 
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Where can we find wicked problems? 
When Rittel & Webber (1973) first compared tame and wicked problems, their 
interests lied in the realm of social policy. Going on at the time in the United 
States were multiple social conflicts: protests against the Vietnam War, the Civil 
Rights Movement, and many other issues poorly managed by and out of the 
immediate control of the government. This radical diversification of values, goals 
and lifestyles was rather unforeseen — mainstream sociology in the 1950’s had 
predicted the rise of a ‘Mass Society’; a homogeneous shared culture of the civilized 
Western countries (Rittel & Webber 1973). We now know that current reality is 
quite the opposite: while globalization drives the rapid diffusion of social and 
cultural phenomena on one hand, on the other hand we have such a diverse set of 
heterogeneous subcultures that it is impossible to even begin identifying all. 
 
All of the wicked problems now evident to researchers did not suddenly emerge 
with the invention of the term. However, bringing the failures of ‘traditional 
planning’ to the center of discussion has had a permanent effect on multiple 
disciplines and fields of science. Our understanding of the complexity within 
human and environmental systems has grown, and we have begun to realize the 
simultaneous strength and vulnerability of these connections. (Batie 2008; Jentoft 
& Chuenpagdee 2009) 
 
Despite the sociological starting point of discussion, current discourse of wicked 
problems also happens largely in context of environmental issues, such as climate 
change. Some disciplines seem to have more eagerly adopted this ‘messy’ approach 
than others. For example, the mainstream of financial economics is only 
beginning to pursue the thought of wickedity, as old models are proven flawed. 
Financial systems in the modern society have largely depended on quantifiable 
units, optimal solutions and known consequences to actions. With criticism 
towards the claimed rationality of human behavior, we have recently seen a new 
rise of complexity economics and behavioral economics, aiming to better understand 
the ways in which economic systems are embedded into our social surroundings. 
(Morgenstern 1972; Brealey et al. 2011; Prast 2004; Vealey 2014) 
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To conclude, seeing wicked problems is not restricted to one field of science or 
practice. Instead, when we begin to look at real-world problems through the eyes 
of wickedity, it will be hard to unsee the multiple connections stemming across 
disciplines. Wicked problems are by nature impossible to completely distinguish 
from each other — framing problems is a wicked issue in itself! 
 
The social side  
Returning to the origins of the term and to Rittel & Webber’s (1973) field of 
study, we can see that wicked problems are always set in the context of human 
behavior and decision-making. Despite the point just stated of wicked issues 
being present in all disciplines, in the end they are about and exist because of 
people. Just as with issues of sustainability, the social structures and systems 
surrounding us define the challenges we face. (Conklin 2007; Christensen 2009; 
Horn & Weber 2007; Batie 2008) 
 
These complex messes are public problems: no one alone can claim ownership or 
patent a solution that would solve the whole issue. There are multiple different 
stakeholders involved in framing the problem, each with their own point of view. 
The public sector has an important role in the process, and is responsible for 
dealing with the consequences: taking care of the citizen and environment 
affected. Wicked problems are characterized by conflicts of values, political and 
financial interests. These underlying aspirations are often left unclear to the public, 
yet all the courses of action we take are driven by them. Causing conflict in 
relation to social messes are the vastly differing opinions on what kind of a future 
is desirable in the first place, what compromises and trade-offs are worth making, 
and who should gain the benefits or suffer losses. (Batie 2008) 
 
This makes the identification of possible solutions more of a social process than an 
exact science. Since by definition wicked problems cannot be solved once and for 
all, dealing with them becomes about creating shared understanding, negotiating 
and facilitation to conclude which actions are for the better and which ones for the 
worse. The objective thus is to gain progress into a direction perceived as better, 
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not to reach any specific or permanent end goals. (Batie 2008; Horn & Weber 
2007; Ritchey 2013; Conklin 2007) 
 
3.2.2     Further defining wickedity 
With this eye-opening discourse of wickedity now going on in many diverse fields 
of science and profession, the issue of framing problems has become increasingly 
important. Especially when we talk of global problems challenging policymaking 
processes on the high level, we quickly realize most of policymaking indeed fits the 
description of wickedity (Levin et al. 2012). To further separate some extremely 
difficult and current challenges, such as global climate change, Levin et al. (2012) 
suggest an addition of four characteristics to describe ‘super wicked problems’:  
 
1. Time is running out. 
2. Those who seek to provide a solution also cause the problem. 
3. The central authority needed to address it is weak or non-existent. 
4. Partly as a result, policy responses discount the future irrationally. 
 
Other researchers have also distinguished between different types of wicked 
problems. Head & Alford (2008), for instance, classify problems on two 
dimensions: complexity of the problem at hand and the diversity of interests of the 
parties involved (see Figure 5 on the next page). They suggest the more versatile 
set of knowledge is needed to provide solutions or the more diverse set of interests 
all parties have, the more wicked the problem is in nature. This typology implies 
that since there are different types of wicked problems, there are different types of 
answers to them as well (Head & Alford 2008). However, there is no prevailing 
paradigm in current research of distinguishing different types of wicked problems 
further — as Rittel & Webber’s (1973) early definition suggested, in the end every 
wicked problem is unique. There may well be use for these types of typologies in 
other contexts, but for the purposes of this study, these complex messes will not 
be differentiated as separate categories but simply referred to as ‘wicked problems’.  
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Figure 5: Typology of wicked problems.  
Head & Alford 2008, Levin et al. 2012, Heifetz 1998. 
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The additions of Levin et al. (2012) to the properties of wicked problems are still 
interesting and relevant within our focus of policymaking. The following pages 
will briefly elaborate on these four characteristics, working as an introduction for 
the next chapter of finding wicked opportunities. 
 
A sense of urgency 
A certain sense of urgency is needed to drive action. The limited nature of time is 
especially important within the discussion of environmental problems: most 
events regarding the loss of biodiversity and climate change are irreversible, and 
problems not only persist but also become more acute as we speak. (Levin et al. 
2012) Levin et al. (2012) suggest this a clear distinction between environmental 
issues and social challenges: the political system can over time mediate opposing 
opinions on policy-making and interventions to social problems, but the capacity 
of our environment is finite.  
 
Natural diversity once lost cannot be brought back. Social sciences show, however, 
that reversing the growth of social inequality and injustice is also harder to attain 
with every generation the problems persist. (Berg & Ostry 2011; Deininger & 
Squire 1998) The effects of bad policy or broken social systems may be huge and 
irreversible, when considering the life of a single person or their family today. 
Here lies the problematic moral dilemma of wicked problems and equity: when 
the aim is to achieve sustainability in the long run, who should pay the price of 
development today? 
 
All parties will never agree upon a single list of global priorities in solving 
problems: each seeks for arguments to support the overruling urgency of their own 
interests over others. Hence, instead of looking for a clear and agreed upon plan, 
we must learn on the go and adjust our actions accordingly. Our ever-changing 
environment calls for agile strategy making, and the complex nature of wicked 
problems accentuates this request: since there are no final answers, we can only try 
to consistently aim for what we see as better than the present. (Doz & Kosonen 
2014; SEE Platform 2013b; Boyer et al. 2011; Spaulding 2014) 
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A fragmented focus 
As Levin et al. (2012) point out, every person trying to solve a wicked problem is 
also contributing to the issue. Though individuals can choose to make sustainable 
choices in their lives, many of their daily actions still involve someone else who is 
making less sustainable ones. It is often impossible to pinpoint clear sources for 
wicked problems, as multiple factors contribute to their existence and 
development (Levin et al. 2012). Thus, finding the leverage points where actions 
most efficiently can create significant and sustainable change is indeed difficult. 
Too often we focus on treating the symptoms instead of true causes. (Conklin 
2007; Rittel & Webber 1973; McGregor 2012) 
 
Since we all are involved in both creating and resolving wicked issues, the danger 
is that though we might agree on a mutual goal of living in a more sustainable 
world, we often vastly disagree on how to pursue this vision. The lack of strategic 
intent hinders the search for novel resolutions (Boyer et al. 2011). The term, as 
Hamel and Prahalad (1989) introduced it in the context of management 
literature, stands for a ‘sustained obsession on winning on all levels of the 
organization’. It enables actors to operate independently while maintaining their 
focus aligned with strategy. Clear strategic intent helps avoid being distracted by 
the restrictions of current models of operation — an aspect that becomes 
extremely important when dealing with problems that have yet to be solved. 
(Hamel & Prahalad 1989) 
 
As we will further explore later in the study, this perspective of creating high-
performing organizations by establishing strategic intent is not far from our 
viewpoint of building a sustainably effective public sector. 
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A call for a ‘glocal’ approach 
Wicked problems are most often both global and local at the same time: since 
people construct these social messes, we also decide whom to involve in creating 
solutions. Depending on the selected definition and wanted level of interference, 
the same issue can be framed to have an impact on a single neighborhood or the 
whole global community. (Rittel & Webber 1973; Levin et al. 2012) 
 
The interdependence of societies has grown with the globalization of economic 
and cultural activities. People may directly communicate and seek for information 
on the global scale on a daily basis, but still also remain members of their local 
communities. Through more transparent production and sharing of information, 
we have become more aware and concerned of global justice and sustainability 
issues; it is not easy to close our eyes from what is happening on the other side of 
the world anymore. (Hämäläinen 2013; Doz & Kosonen 2014; McGregor 2012) 
 
Lack of central authority is recognized a key issue in achieving change on the 
systemic level. (Levin et al. 2012) Despite the many international organizations 
promoting common agendas, such as the UN or OECD, affecting policies on 
many national levels simultaneously is an extremely ambitious agenda to pursue. 
On the other hand, the lack of localized measures and practices is also 
problematic. We cannot assume that even general guidelines would suit every 
situation — every local community is unique, and so are the wicked problems they 
face. (Bailey 2013; Rittel & Webber 1973) 
 
One approach to this need for simultaneous localization and global authority is 
education regarding the norms and values of local communities. Instead of 
providing ready-made solutions or limitations, the aim is to create, local, adaptive, 
self-sustaining and self-reinforcing systems. When people have decided for 
themselves that change is necessary, it is bound to happen in one way or another. 
(Vandenbroeck 2012; SEE Platform 2013b; Bettencourt & Brelsford 2015) 
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A lack of perspective 
Given the increasing amount of knowledge we have gained of sustainability issues 
and the dynamics underlying wicked problems, significant change in the way we 
make decisions has not happened. Policy-making tends to still consider relatively 
short time horizons, and we constantly make decisions that disregard information 
we should be aware of and take into account. (Levin et al. 2012; Meadows et al. 
1972) 
 
Research suggests that people most often cannot see the consequences of their 
actions neither in relation to their larger environment or very far ahead in their 
future, yet alone the lifetime of generations to come (see Figure 6 below). 
(Meadows et al. 1972; Meadows 2008; Meadows 1999) We tend to give greater 
weight to direct satisfaction than to solutions sustainable in the long run. This 
behavior of individuals is also apparent in the way our political institutions work: 
often aiming to answer to the immediate interests of society, while discounting 
the future in sometimes explicitly irrational ways. (Levin et al. 2012) 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Human perspectives. Meadows 1972. 
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To create decision-making processes that are truly global and oriented far enough 
into the future, we need a focus on building discourse and structures that keep our 
mutual long-term interests at the top of our minds. (Levin et al. 2012; Ainslie 
2005) As Levin et al. (2012) illustrate, these problems are similar to those of a 
smoker trying to quit. While he might not be able to resist the temptation at all 
times, during moments of clarity he can create mechanisms that will help him get 
past difficult times: he may, for example, make a deal with his friends to buy them 
dinner for each cigarette he smokes. The same logic applies to regulation, 
guidelines and incentives in governance: they are some of the long-term ‘lock-in’ 
mechanisms available to the decision-makers on both local and global scales 
(Michie, Atkins, et al. 2011; Michie, van Stralen, et al. 2011).  
 
Summarizing wicked problems 
While resolving wicked problems is about continuously facilitating a process of 
finding better options, we must consider the voices of future generations and 
those not immediately affected by our decisions as well. This calls for a better 
understanding of the mechanisms by which we tend to discount future scenarios, 
the larger systemic effects of different kinds of actions, and the ways in which we 
can learn to adjust our behavior in a larger scale. Given the conflict-induced 
nature of wicked problems, there is a need for neutral facilitators able to create 
and maintain common ground. (Levin et al. 2012; Meadows et al. 1972; Conklin 
2007; Rittel & Webber 1973; McGregor 2012; Bailey 2013; Vandenbroeck 2012; 
Hämäläinen 2013; Doz & Kosonen 2014) 
 
These demands, combined with the unique nature of every wicked problem, set a 
challenging situation for decision-makers. Achieving sustainable change on a large 
scale is not possible without finding ways to empower local actors to operate for a 
mutual and clear goal: building strategic intent for our communities. 
 
Now that we have familiarized ourselves with the nature of wicked problems, the 
next chapter will take us through several approaches to tackling wickedity. 
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4     A world of opportunities 
 
“Do not be pushed by your problems, be lead by your dreams.” 
 
— Ralph Waldo Emmerson 
 
Having now discussed the qualities of wicked problems we face in our pursuit of 
sustainability, this chapter will take us through approaches to dealing with them 
within the field of public governance. Many different fields of academia and 
practice are on the search for answers, but each mostly within their own 
frameworks and established principles of operation. This chapter aims to provide 
an overview to how wicked opportunities may be seized. 
 
Since wicked problems cannot be solved once and for all, the search for ‘best 
practices’ in the field is marginally impossible. (Rittel & Webber 1973) Especially 
given the short time frame of research and experiments so far, in most cases we 
cannot yet determine if a certain change of policy has been successful or not in the 
larger scale. (Head & Alford 2008) This thesis deals with this notion by not 
searching for any single best way to operate, but by examining the common 
characteristics behind dealing with wickedity in governance. 
 
The first part of this chapter will explain that in order to deal with wickedity, 
innovation is needed. The second part will argue that the key to systematic 
sustainable innovation in governance lies within transition management. The focus 
of this thesis is especially on the strategic level of transition management and 
creating strategic intent. This process of building strategic consensus will be briefly 
mentioned at the end of this chapter and further discussed in the next one. 
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4.1     Leaping into the great unknown 
 
”We set sail on this new sea because there is new knowledge to be gained, and new 
rights to be won, and they must be won and used for the progress of all people.” 
 
— President John F. Kennedy, ”We choose to go to the moon”, 1962 
 
The basis for our modern society was built in the age of industrialization, and 
much of the progress we have taken in shaping our surroundings is due to 
technical innovation and breakthroughs in science. However, in the world of 
wicked problems where uncertainties and decision stakes are high, traditional 
scientific methods as value neutral and looking for certainty cannot alone provide 
answers. With the complex and conflicted nature of problems, post-normal science 
(PNS) is deemed a more appropriate strategy for solving them. (Funtowicz & 
Ravetz 1993)  
 
‘Normal’ science builds upon existing knowledge and ‘known truths’, while PNS 
aims to integrate both ‘formal science’ and the contributions of an extended peer 
community: all the people affected by and involved in a dialogue of the issue at 
hand. (Batie 2008; McGregor 2012; Funtowicz & Ravetz 1993) In PNS, hard 
facts and quantitative data usually dominating the field of science are overruled by 
qualitative methods and questions of values and commitment. People dealing with 
wicked problems are always looking at multiple equally valid perspectives of 
different stakeholders, and many traditional scientific methods have trouble in 
dealing with this plurality of conflicting goals and the uncertainty of 
circumstances it creates. (Funtowicz & Ravetz 1993; McGregor 2012; 
Bettencourt & Brelsford 2015)  
 
This post-normal approach is closely related to the term of innovation: it serves 
the purpose of leaping into the unknown and discovering new ways to see our 
current problems. Radical innovation projects aiming to create a shift in the status 
quo are in many ways related to the requirements of dealing with wicked issues: 
being surrounded by a great deal of uncertainty and the inability to rely on prior 
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competencies or experiences, to name a few. New knowledge has to be 
continuously developed during the innovation process, as it does when facing 
wicked problems. (Alexander & Van Knippenberg 2012) 
 
Public sector decision-makers have eagerly adopted this idea of creating new ideas 
with value to the society. Social innovation and public sector innovation have 
emerged with respect to the statement that “wicked problems need wicked 
solutions”. (Kerry et al. 2009; Murray et al. 2010; Sørensen & Torfing 2012) 
Their aim is to generate societal involvement in the planning and production of 
public services, (Murray et al. 2010; Mulgan 2014) and they typically suggest user-
centered design and design thinking as methodologies for innovation, which fully 
supports the notion of the extended peer community in PNS. Both approaches 
aim to question the dogmatic way a small amount of experts produce 
unquestionable ‘truths’, and to make room for silent signals and the voices of all 
those affected in the process. (Best 2011; Alves 2013; Commission of the 
European Communities 2009; Mulgan 2014)  
 
The next pages will further explore the relations of innovation in the public sector. 
The following subchapter will then introduce transition management as a way to 
coordinate all these innovation and design activities and steer them towards a 
mutual goal of large-scale structural innovation in the long run. 
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4.1.1     Innovation and the public sector 
Innovation in public management is not an entirely new agenda, but a more 
systematic way of pursuing these initiatives has begun to emerge within the past 
decade or so. (Bason 2010) Many high-level decision-making arenas, such as the 
European Commission, have actively taken on promoting innovation. The 
Europe 2020 strategy describes it as the key to tackling wicked problems: 
 
“ – – our future standard of living depends on our ability to drive innovation in 
products, services, business and social processes and models. This is why innovation 
has been placed at the heart of the Europe 2020 strategy. Innovation is also our 
best means of successfully tackling major societal challenges, such as climate change, 
energy and resource scarcity, health and ageing, which are becoming more urgent 
by the day.” (European Commission 2010) 
 
As mentioned in the very beginning of this thesis, the role of governments in 
driving forward an issue such as this is important: they can support the agenda for 
example by legislation, creating nation-wide programmes, or using methods of 
persuasion. (Murray et al. 2010) However, it is also claimed that the government 
should learn to be more strategic in its actions and let go of the details in its 
promotion of innovation. The job of the government, according to organizations 
working with social innovation, e.g. NESTA and MindLab, is to provide 
resources, central guidance and a clear innovation agenda based on the long-term 
goals of sustainable development. (Gillinson et al. 2010; Bason 2010) 
 
Who should be involved? 
This idea of empowering communities answers to the need of localization 
identified earlier in discussion of wicked problems. However, taking policymaking 
activities from the highest level of governance to local environments may also have 
its downsides: horizontal learning or scaling does not occur, when local 
communities each act independently. Initiatives of building innovation toolkits, 
case studies and other means of sharing experiences seem to have a very limited 
effect on the scalability of local innovation. (Bason 2010) Research shows that 
local policymaking in the municipalities in Finland is extremely introverted in 
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nature: innovation activities mainly occur only within the organization or in some 
cases with other municipal organizations. Much of the development and 
innovation work overlaps with that of other municipalities, public organizations, 
universities and the private sector, but chances for collaboration are hardly seized. 
(Sotarauta et al. 2012) Evidence suggests that while collaborative actions have 
begun to gain a foothold in public management, not much has been achieved in 
the field of collaborative public strategic management. (Bryson & Berry 2010) 
 
Rittel (1972), in relation to wicked problems, stated the importance of involving a 
wide network to tackling these messy issues:  
 
“The knowledge needed in a planning problem, a wicked problem, is not 
concentrated in any single head; for wicked problems there are no specialists. The 
expertise, which you need in dealing with a wicked problem, is usually distributed 
over many people. Those people who are the best experts with the best knowledge, 
are usually those who are likely to be affected by your solution.” (Rittel 1972) 
 
As established here, dealing with wicked problems needs to be a joint effort of 
multiple disciplines and many horizontal and vertical levels of government. As it 
now is, just involving all the willing participants within a single public 
organization seems to be an overwhelming task (Sitra 2014): there certainly is a 
lot of new ground to be explored in relation to enabling and encouraging 
innovation within governance. 
 
Most mainstream discussions of policy development also have a strong emphasis 
today on citizen-centered methods: letting the general public affect, design and 
decide on matters regarding themselves. According to the principles of post-
normal science, the actors most committed to solving issues in their environments 
may well be local citizen, now doing research and solving problems neglected by 
the formal institutions responsible for them in the first place. (Funtowicz & 
Ravetz 1993; Vealey 2014; Bland et al. 2010)  
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This recognition of proactive citizenship and its involvement in public decision-
making varies greatly. In cultures with a tradition of politically active and strong 
local communities, efforts are often supported. In other environments, activities 
may be ignored or even hindered by the government. An OECD study from 2010 
clearly states that citizen engagement in Finland is weak, especially on the state 
level of administration. (OECD Public Governance Reviews 2010) Possibilities 
today are exponentially growing, as technology enables the popularization of 
actions previously reserved for professionals. With the likes of cheap and small 
sensors, crowdsourcing and communication platforms, visualization tools and 
open data, we could create new possibilities for both scientific and innovative 
approaches to citizen engagement. (Funtowicz & Ravetz 1993) 
 
Innovation in networks 
The traditional model of clearly distinguishing the roles of government, the civil 
society and the private sector has recently been under scrutiny. New approaches 
have emerged, where focus lies on identifying the multiple actors needed to drive 
change on societal and global levels. Evidence suggests, that the public sector or 
international organizations rarely can generate societal change without the 
involvement of other actors: top-down plans hardly ever work out just as 
intended. (STEPS 2007) Independent ministries and autonomous local level 
policymaking in municipalities characterize the Finnish government. (OECD 
Public Governance Reviews 2010) Public-sector reforms within the past couple of 
decades have answered to this by slowly moving towards a mode of more active 
collaboration with NGO’s and the private sector, in some areas such as health care 
even shifting to the privatization of public services.  
 
Models of non-hierarchical networks aim to provide answers to the dilemma of a 
need for collaboration without top-down coordination. Research has shown 
plenty of advantages experienced when establishing ‘free-form’ collaboration. 
Eliminating hierarchical power can lead to grater speed in achieving a certain end 
result, but an important notion is that most benefits of self-organization only 
seem to be realized when the ultimate intention of actions is clear to all 
participants (Smith 1994). The main risk of carrying out public sector innovation 
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activities in networks is, indeed, internal conflict due to differing priorities, values, 
and expectations of outcomes. (Camarinha-Matos et al. 2008; Bland et al. 2010) 
In the case of sharing responsibility of the design and production of public 
services, also comes along the question of legitimacy in decision-making: is 
political power being used in a way that is just for all members of the society? A 
total lack of coordination may undermine the entire innovation process, yet there 
are no universal laws for the right amount of facilitation needed in networks. The 
public sector must develop and institutionalize mechanisms to handle innovation 
processes without overpowering local policymaking. (Bland et al. 2010)  
 
Some researchers see all these pitfalls of network management to stem from 
difficulties in knowledge and information management. (Bland et al. 2010; Osborne 
& Brown 2011; Van Bueren et al. 2003) The role of public sector management 
should, according to this viewpoint, be merely to enable and encourage the 
sharing of ideas and to then mobilize the necessary resources to implement 
selected suggestions. The construction of such innovation spaces requires support 
in generating shared understanding amongst participants: people from different 
professional and cultural backgrounds will see problems and possible solutions 
differently. (Bland et al. 2010) Design methods, as the introduction to this thesis 
explained, provide an approach to facilitating discussion across silos.  
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4.2     Steering towards structural innovation 
 
“In the space between chaos and shape there was another chance.”  
 
— Jeanette Winterson 
 
Transition management, as Loorbach (2007) defines it, is a mode of governance 
to guide large systems towards sustainability. It provides a macro-perspective on 
the innovation activities just discussed: when aiming for sustained society-level 
change, no innovation or even a network of innovators is sufficient alone. 
Transition management is a proactive and future-oriented approach, utilizing 
both top-down and bottom-up techniques in policymaking. Its ambition is to 
generate change on the structural and social levels of our society: the very context 
in which wicked problems were earlier in this study claimed to exist. A transition 
in this relation stands for a continuous process, where the ‘structural character’ of 
a system fundamentally changes. As result of a transition, we reach a new 
equilibrium: arrive to a new (more or less) stabile state. (Kemp et al. 2005; 
Rotmans et al. 2001; Kemp & Loorbach 2002; Vandenbroeck 2012; Loorbach 
2007) 
 
Another definition by Timmermans (2006) describes transitions as “structural 
innovations of societal systems, in reaction to wicked problems threatening 
development”. The connection between wicked problems and transitions is clear: in 
order to deal with wickedity, we must learn to guide transition processes and 
continuously steer our societies towards sustainable development. An example of 
an ongoing transition could be, for instance, the rise of renewable energy sources 
and their pursuit to become the dominant source of energy production. (Rotmans 
et al. 2001; Loorbach 2007; Timmermans 2006; Kemp et al. 2005) 
 
Transitions consist of multiple connected and self-reinforcing processes on many 
levels. They are not caused by any single change (policy act or technological 
innovation for example), but can be significantly accelerated by them. Periods of 
slow and rapid change take turns during the course of a transition. (Rotmans et al. 
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2001; Kemp et al. 2005; Kemp & Loorbach 2002) The process is described to 
happen in four phases (see Figure 7 below):   
 
1) Predevelopment, where the status quo does not change.  
2) Take-off, where the state of the system begins to shift.  
3) Acceleration, where visible structural changes take place through an 
accumulation of changes that react in relation to each other.  
4) Stabilization, where the speed of social change decreases and a new 
dynamic equilibrium is reached. (Rotmans et al. 2001) 
 
What is notable, however, is that the process in reality is not linear but builds 
upon multiple distinct yet connected innovations and changes within the 
environment. A transition is seen to typically span over a generation’s lifetime, 
and it often takes more than 25 years to reach a new somewhat stabile state in 
terms of that particular transition. During the time of change, individual 
innovations may be radical or incremental, and multiple developments may also 
affect each other in complex ways. Policy changes are situated in this context of 
social, technical and economical changes. (Rotmans et al. 2001; Kemp et al. 2005) 
 
 
 
Figure 7: The phases of a transition. Rotmans et al. 2001. 
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The multiple levels of transitions 
Transition management is based on a multi-layer perspective on change in society. 
It sees that transitions arise when developments on different scales reinforce each 
other. Macro-scale elements such as political and social cultures, the built and 
natural environments, and prevailing paradigms provide pressure from the 
landscape level. Micro-scale events, such as the innovation of new technologies, 
challenge existing structures and prompt emerging change. In the middle of these 
two on the meso-level are regimes, the dominant ways and infrastructures of 
doing things. Regimes are by definition hard to change: our interests, rules and 
beliefs situated on this level are naturally directed to maintaining and optimizing 
existing structures, not disrupting them. The macro level of socio-technical systems 
is what transition management ultimately seeks to change. (Rotmans et al. 2001; 
Vandenbroeck 2012) Figure 8 below illustrates this interplay of change between 
different layers. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: The levels of transition management. Rotmans et al. 2001. 
 
Our earlier discussion on wicked problems provided viewpoints to the macro level 
phenomena: though we might recognize a messy societal problem we need to deal 
with, tackling the huge entity as such is remarkably hard. Innovation activities and 
design methodologies, for their part, provide solutions on the micro scale in 
enhancing rapid iteration, experimentation and innovation. It is, however, hard to 
break through from a niche to the scale of a regime, as this means changing the 
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behavior that is daily produced in routines of individuals, groups and larger 
organizations. (Ceschin 2014) 
 
Despite the label, transition management is less about ‘managing’ and more about 
actively creating the right conditions for change to happen.  There is no one path for 
reaching a certain equilibrium level, but change can in fact happen through 
different means. Many change processes are also simply out of the control of 
government: cultural change, for example, can be seen to happen more or less 
autonomously despite public sector involvement. What the government can do is 
influence the speed, direction and the odds of a transition: provide visions of a 
desirable future and enable innovation and implementation. (Vandenbroeck 2012; 
Kemp & Loorbach 2002; Rotmans et al. 2001)  
 
Vandenbroeck (2012) describes three elements to have an important role in a 
transition process:  
 
1. A guiding image of a more sustainable future. 
2. A collection of innovative experiments that explore the boundaries of  
what is possible. 
3. An infrastructure to extract and diffuse the learning from those 
experiences. (Vandenbroeck 2012; Kemp & Loorbach 2002)  
 
As we explored in the introduction of this thesis, strategic design aims to answer 
to all of these elements by bringing design methodology into strategy making and 
enabling rapid prototyping and feedback loops. (Boyer et al. 2011; Best 2011; 
Stevens et al. 2008) The relation between the transition management approach 
and design is, however, academically fairly unexplored. Ceschin (2014) has 
recently coupled the two, creating a framework for what he calls socio-technical 
system design. He suggests the design process should start with identifying 
opportunities to produce multiple experiments in relation to a certain transition 
topic (a design brief), and that the guiding image or transition vision emerges 
through the process. (Ceschin 2014) 
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Ceshin’s approach proposes a significantly broader scope for design actions and 
the needed skillset than what is traditionally understood as design. Strategic 
design describes the scope and role of design in a similar way, only with somewhat 
differing terminology. (Boyer et al. 2011; Ceschin 2014) These two 
categorizations of design are very close to each other in definitions, and may be 
regarded as ultimately discussing the same principles.  
 
The next subchapter will further introduce the process of transition management, 
and concentrate on the first notion on Vandenbroeck’s (2012) list: crafting a 
vision of a sustainable future.   
 
 
4.2.1     Shaping the future through strategic intent 
“What you choose for your future is more important than what you know about 
your past or present capabilities.” 
— Charles Smith, 1994 
 
The process of transition management, as Rotmans et al. (2001) describe it, is 
based on long-term transition visions, which function as a framework for 
formulating short-term objectives and evaluating existing policy (see Figure 9 on 
the next page). (Rotmans et al. 2001) These visions are not stabile, but change 
with time as new knowledge is created and the complexity surrounding them is 
better understood. Midway goals are set, as they are in current policymaking 
patterns, but in transition management these objectives are produced by 
backcasting: deriving them from the overall visions. The task of transition 
management is, thus, to guide towards radical change in incremental steps. In the 
Finnish policymaking scene, think-tank Demos Helsinki has recently introduced 
backcasting methods to the context of public sector development. The method 
aims to generate strategic learning on the constraints and opportunities of the 
transition scene, while coordinating action towards the common vision. 
(Neuvonen & Ache 2014; Rotmans et al. 2001)  
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Figure 9: Short-term vs. long-term policymaking. Rotmans et al. 2001. 
 
 
Transition visions are so similar to our earlier definition of strategic intent that the 
two terms will be used as synonymous from here on. They are characterized as 
appealing and innovative visions of a desired future, supported by a broad range of 
actors. Strategic intent aligns the actions of everyone involved towards an 
inspiring and challenging goal. (Rotmans et al. 2001; Smith 1994; Hamel & 
Prahalad 1989)  
 
Future-led thinking 
Smith (1994) in his work describes successful transition leadership through the 
metaphor of Merlin the Magician: the wizard was known for his abilities to see 
into the future and to live ‘backwards in time’. This kind of future-first –thinking is 
essential to generating change. Hamel & Prahalad (1989) in their first publication 
of strategic intent introduced examples from leading companies in various fields, 
and the common factor behind success they identified was the courage of these 
organizations to envision a future that could not be reasonably implemented in 
the current state of these companies. The combination of seeing a future still 
unreachable and building commitment to pursue this radical vision is the essence 
of strategic intent. (Smith 1994; Hamel & Prahalad 1989) 
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The main challenge of building strategic intent is to change the culture of an 
organization. The contradiction between established ways of doing and thinking 
and new strategic intent creates creative tension, which Senge (1997) describes to 
be the driving force of innovation. While strategic intent is very explicit about the 
desired ends, it is flexible to means and leaves room for new ideas to emerge. 
(Senge 1997; Smith 1994; Hamel & Prahalad 1989) In the words of Hamel & 
Prahalad (1989): “Achieving strategic intent requires enormous creativity with respect 
to means. But this creativity comes in the service of a clearly prescribed end.” Creative 
tension can be resolved by either shaping the reality towards the vision, or by 
forming a vision to match the current reality — in which case we can argue the 
vision is no vision at all. (Senge 1997)  
 
The role of government in transition management  
Despite the earlier introduction of innovation networks and decentralized 
decision-making, the government still has an essential part in the process of 
transition management. Strategic intent, as described, needs to be actively 
cultivated. Rotmans et al. (2001) suggest that the government should take a role 
in facilitating the process: not always providing content, but inspiring and 
encouraging participants to a long-term commitment to collaborative learning. 
(Rotmans et al. 2001; Kemp et al. 2005)  
 
This position of the government as a facilitator is very different in nature to the 
current leading and controlling role it has in most of state-led innovation. The 
fundamental shift in thinking that needs to happen is recognizing that 
government itself does not hold answers to the wicked issues we face, but the 
commitment and determination of a larger network of actors is crucial in 
generating change. (STEPS 2007) 
 
Local government has an important role in the transition process as well, as it 
holds the keys to enabling policy experimentation and radical prototyping. New 
ideas can be effectively tested and implemented in small scale, when local 
policymakers see their role as enablers of innovation instead of gatekeepers of 
change. (STEPS 2007; Vandenbroeck 2012)  
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Does Finland have strategic intent?  
In 2010, the Finnish Government commissioned an OECD study to evaluate the 
abilities of Finland to respond to horizontal challenges at both the state level and 
across multiple layers of governance. The study findings claim that while the 
government has formulated high-level visions of the future, its mechanisms of 
generating future forecasts are inflexible and cannot incorporate emerging issues 
as they arise. The biggest issue identified in the study was, indeed, the lack of 
collective commitment to realizing strategy:  
 
“Adherence to the government’s common vision could be improved by addressing 
both incentives and values within the public service. Finland is hindered in its 
ability to achieve collective commitment on both fronts, and at both the strategic 
and individual levels.” (OECD Public Governance Reviews 2010) 
 
The lack of incentives and support for horizontal collaboration within government 
and with the network of actors outside of the public sector shows as a clear speed 
bump on the way to implementing strategy. The study also recognized the silo-
based approach to policy development and implementation to be one of the most 
significant problems in the Finnish public administration. Performance-
management systems and budgetary policies fail to support the pursuit of an 
overall strategic vision across different levels of administration. State officials 
interviewed by the OECD study felt that the strategic vision is not clear enough, 
and some of the goals seemed unrelated to other issues addressed. (OECD Public 
Governance Reviews 2010)   
 
The strategic vision of each government is communicated through the 
Government Programme, a document formed by coalition partners that sets out 
the main focus of the incoming government (OECD Public Governance Reviews 
2010). The Government Programmes of Finland from the past three decades will 
later be used as material for the main empirical study of this thesis, and a critical 
discourse analysis applied on them in order to find out how strategic discourse is 
created in the highest levels of state government.  
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Next, the final section of context review examines the mechanisms of building 
strategic intent in more detail. After that, these findings will be applied in 
empirical research on the formation of strategic intent in Finnish governance.  
 
 
5     A world of common intent 
 
“Tactics is knowing what to do when there is something to do, 
 strategy is knowing what to do when there is nothing to do.” 
 
— Savielly Tartakower, chess Grandmaster 
 
Most organizations are rather good at making things happen when they know 
what to do. Managerial ‘best practices’ may help in optimizing parts of an 
established agenda, but are often of no use in generating truly radical visions for 
the future. Within the field of business, management’s inability to think and act 
strategically has been identified a significant detractor of an organization’s 
performance. The problem is mainly a question of creating structures to enable 
and foster the building of strategic intent across the network of actors. (Liedtka 
1998; Casey & Goldman 2010; Bonn 2001) 
 
Strategic management in the public sector has become increasingly common 
within the past generation — approximately 25 years. A near-continuous chain of 
government reforms starting in the 1990’s has supported this growth in Finland, 
where management practices and performance measurement have gained a strong 
foothold. On the negative, introducing new reform agendas on a fast pace has 
created an exhaustion of renewals: most of the changes risk never becoming fully 
implemented before new orders arrive. (Bryson & Berry 2010; OECD Public 
Governance Reviews 2010) One comment on the preliminary study vividly 
brought this problematic notion up, as discussed in the previous chapter.  
 
This chapter provides an overview into the field of strategy and concentrates on 
the mechanisms of building strategic intent as a driver for success in the long 
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term. The first subchapter introduces strategic management as a field of study and 
the viewpoint of strategy-as-practice, while the second takes us into the 
mechanisms of building strategic intent by discourse. The final part will 
summarize my approach to how an organization can rhetorically create strategic 
intent to foster innovativeness in its pursuit of sustainability. 
 
 
5.1     Searching for the recipe of success 
Research on strategic management seeks answers to the question of why some 
organizations consistently outperform competitors, i.e. why some strategies are more 
successful than others. (Hitt et al. 2004; Hoskisson et al. 1999; Nag et al. 2007; 
Porter 1991) The discipline originates from the field of business policy and was 
initially formed in the late 1950’s (Ghemawat 2002). Since then, it has developed 
into an established field of research in business and organizational studies. 
(Hoskisson et al. 1999; Hitt et al. 2004) 
 
However, as several recent studies (Nag et al. 2007; Hitt et al. 2004; Mintzberg 
2007) point out, the field itself is fragmented and lacks clear, explicitly approved 
understanding on what strategy or strategic management are by definition: there 
are nearly as many ways of describing the field as there are authors talking about 
it. Most conceptualizations of strategic management can be seen to offer only 
partial insights into the complexity of a strategy process. (Hendry 2000) This adds 
a problematic note to the public sector conversation, where many ‘best practices’ 
adapted from the private sector have limited or very context specific empirical 
evidence to support them. As discussed earlier in relation to wicked problems, 
generic rules of thumb most often do not apply to complex situations. (Rittel & 
Webber 1973) 
 
Recently, a line of research on the practice of strategy has offered insights to how 
strategic management can be seen as a collection of behaviors. Rather than trying 
to adopt strategic management as a “thing” you can take into use, this viewpoint 
sees strategy making as routinized behaviors of strategic thinking, acting and 
learning. (Bryson & Berry 2010; Vaara & Whittington 2012) This thesis agrees 
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with this view of strategy-as-practice, which will be further elaborated on in the 
following subchapter. The next pages will first briefly describe the basis of strategy 
and strategic management, providing some background. 
 
Defining strategy 
The word strategy in its original meaning was used in the context of battle in 
ancient Greece, to describe the ability to employ all available resources to win a 
conflict. It has since been widely used in the military and in political discourse, 
but only emerged in the management context a few decades ago. Recently, 
criticism has arisen on the use of strategy as an expression to hold all the various 
meanings it does in the management studies of today. It is claimed that the 
traditional interpretation of strategy has lead to management misunderstanding 
strategy making as a one-time activity that implies a strong focus on competition 
and the competitive environment. This, in turn, has resulted in a focus on short-
term tactics over sustainable strategy. Another pitfall lies in interpreting strategy 
as a means (or a ploy (Mintzberg 2007)) to any specific, known end – in its 
original meaning, this goal was to win a battle. The nature of precise goals, 
however, indicates temporary success at the cost of sustainability. If the strategy is 
to win one battle, this does not imply a win of the war. (Mitreanu 2006; Benito-
Ostolaza & Sanchis-Llopis 2014) This critique is acknowledged in this study, and 
strategy thus defined as continuously creating sustainable, long-term success.  
 
Traditional viewpoints on strategy 
Theorists of strategic management have for long had differing views on how 
strategies are composed. These viewpoints can be roughly divided into two 
distinguished streams of theory: the rational and dynamic perspectives. (Farjoun 
2002; Mintzberg 2007)  
  
The rational view, stemming from industrial organization (IO) economics and the 
likes of Porter (1991) as its advocates, sees strategy as a plan: a logical, linear 
process, lead intentionally by a manager. Formulation and planning precede 
implementation, and this cycle is repeated in a more or less scheduled manner. 
(Casey & Goldman 2010; Porter 1991)  
56 
The viewpoint also looks at strategy as a position: it believes that the success of an 
organization depends on how it positions itself in relation to the external 
environment, and that strategy thus should be derived from the thorough 
inspection of competitive forces by tools such as SWOT analysis. (Porter 1991) 
 
In the context of wicked problems, as we earlier explored, this one-shot approach 
is not feasible. Traditional management tools, based largely on forecasting events 
on the markets, are proving to be useless on their own. The rather drastic 
simplifications that theories in the rational perspective tend to make have been 
described as static and fragmented. (Fontaine 2008; Mintzberg 1993; Farjoun 
2002) The detailed planning approach requires “taming” the wickedity of the 
environment, which in turn leads to overseeing many crucial and subtle elements. 
The systemic impacts of actions may be something entirely else than what was 
intended in the first place. (Kemp et al. 2005; Kemp & Loorbach 2002) 
 
In contrast to these limitations of the rational view on strategy stands the dynamic 
perspective. Advocates of this view, Henry Mintzberg being one of the most 
notable ones, see strategy as patterns in streams of deliberate (realized as intended) 
and emergent (realized despite or without intentions) actions (see Figure 10 
below). (Mintzberg 2007) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Forms of strategy. Mintzberg and Waters 1985. 
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While strategies are unlikely to be found in one extreme or the other on this 
deliberate–emergent scale, these opposing dimensions form a continuum on 
which most real-world strategies fall. The dynamic view sees strategy as a fluid 
process, where no particular set of actions has to precede another, and strategy is 
simultaneously formulated and formed. It also looks at strategy as perspective: the 
organization’s shared, inherent perception of the world. (Mintzberg & Waters 
1985; Mintzberg 2007) This viewpoint of strategy as a social construct serves as 
the basis for strategy-as-practice: strategy is created in the rhetoric, the decisions and 
the actions of all those involved. (Mintzberg 2007) 
 
Rational and dynamic viewpoints are sometimes described as opposing, but the 
dynamic view in fact extends on the rational viewpoint, including both intended 
and emergent processes in strategy making (Mintzberg 2007; Mintzberg & 
Waters 1985; Casey & Goldman 2010). Looking at definitions of strategic 
management spanning over four decades (Bracker 1980; Jemison 1981; Nag et al. 
2007; Eden & Ackermann 2000; Farjoun 2002), we can observe the shift from a 
strong managerial focus to a more dynamic perspective on strategies. Together 
with the growing understanding on how strategy is formed, the field of strategic 
management has evolved from the industrial settings of early research, slowly 
building the ability to answer to increasingly complex issues in the new 
competitive landscape (Hoskisson et al. 1999; Hitt et al. 2004).  
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5.2     Practicing strategy 
As outlined in the beginning of the previous subchapter, strategic management in 
light of the practice theory can be seen as a generative system producing patterns 
of strategic action — both deliberate and emergent. Strategy making is seen as 
fundamentally of a social nature. Strategic decisions are made by people and 
groups of people, embedded in the social structures which they simultaneously 
construct. This social character exists in complex combinations of mental models 
and qualities, discourses and actions, and also the physical objects needed to 
perform these practices. (Bryson & Berry 2010)  
 
In addition to shaping decision-making in organizations, strategic practices can 
change the nature of the system itself. Instead of relying on rigid processes, these 
practices can encourage iteration and change, thus enabling dynamic strategy 
making in the pursuit of strategic intent. Dynamism is achieved by consistently 
combining what Salvato (2003) describes as core micro-strategies with new 
initiatives: continuously exploring emergent possibilities without radically shaking 
the core of the organization. Change is, as characterized in connection to 
transition management, “radically incremental”. Providing a sense of continuity, 
as we earlier explored, is vital in crafting strategic intent. (Rotmans et al. 2001) 
An example of a micro-strategy could be, for example, the consistent use of user-
testing methods to provide confirmation in decision-making. (Vaara & 
Whittington 2012; Bryson & Berry 2010; Salvato 2003) These potential micro-
strategies and other practices in strategy making will next be further explored 
through the concepts of strategic thinking and learning.  
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5.2.1     Practices of strategic planning and thinking 
The contrast between practices of strategic planning and strategic thinking is most 
fiercely announced by Mintzberg (1993) in his work The Rise and Fall of Strategic 
Planning. In his opinion, the field of strategic management is obsessed with the 
notion of planning and control, to the point at which any uncertainty is terrifying 
to the planner. Strategic planning practices aim to control the consequences of 
actions, to eliminate chance: any unforeseen actions or events. This in turn is 
claimed to lead to a variety of practices harmful to the strategy process — avoiding 
risk, repressing creativity, and failing to appreciate spontaneity — suppressing the 
results of strategic thinking. (Mintzberg 1993; Montuori 2003; Wildavsky 1973) 
 
Research has shown that perspectives of strategy developed at relatively stable 
times in the economy tend to be more of the rational kind in nature. (Hoskisson 
et al. 1999) The fascination towards formal planning stems from the time of 
Industrial Organizations and years of steady economic growth. Authors such as 
Chandler (1962) and Ansoff (1965) drew focus on rationalism and economic 
determinism, separating formulation from implementation, and emphasizing an 
environment known through elaborate analysis. (Montuori 2003; Mintzberg & 
Waters 1985; Hoskisson et al. 1999) Many of these principles have since been 
adapted to strategy making in the public sector, though the context of wickedity 
clearly implies the need for more sophisticated strategy making practices. (Bryson 
& Berry 2010; OECD Public Governance Reviews 2010)  
 
Strategic planning was first actively criticized in the 70’s, and more vigorously so 
when the surrounding economical conditions suddenly changed with the recession 
of the 1980’s in the United States. Interestingly, this did not mean the demise of 
strategic planning: instead, planners brought up the notion of turbulent 
environments bringing challenges to the planning process. The solution was to 
increase the level of planning practices — the more ‘turbulent’ the environment, 
the more detailed plans were thought necessary to survive. Mintzberg (1993)  
questions this notion of challenging environments, and argues that ‘turbulence’ is 
change that planning cannot comprehend or control – hence the problem lies not 
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in the environment, but actually in the practices of planning itself. (Mintzberg 
1993) 
 
If our time is any more ‘turbulent’ than the previous decades or not can be argued 
upon, but fact is that all environments are prone to change: transitions, as 
introduced earlier, are constantly changing our societies. (Hamel & Prahalad 
1989) Some organizations experience more disruptions than others, while other 
environments at the same time remain relatively stable. In the context of public 
management, the nature of competition and competitive disruption are slightly 
different than within the field of business, but these same basic principles apply. 
Though all changes in the markets do not have a direct affect on the government 
itself, they do on the lives of citizen and the private sector, thus changing the 
dynamics of the complex environment in which the government operates. 
 
Given that environments do change, strategic planning practices have several 
pitfalls in maintaining sustainable strategy. Since planning is often strongly based 
on competitive analysis, plans tend to be focused on a current ‘snapshot view’ of 
the environment. There is no accurate way to predict the future actions of the 
players in the field, yet to foresee entirely new actors invading the environment. 
Still, as discussed earlier, looking forward is vital for setting strategic intent. 
(Mintzberg 1993; Hamel & Prahalad 1989; Liedtka 1998) When focus lies on the 
actions of others, strategy quickly becomes a game of imitation, which can easily 
be lost. Hamel and Prahalad (1989) believe that strategy formation should not 
aim to find a position within the existing environment, but instead to create an 
entirely new space suited for the organization’s own unique capabilities and goals. 
Strategic planning, given its tendency of being risk avoidant, driven by financial 
measures, and merely incremental in terms of change, does not foster innovation 
and creativity. 
 
Does this imply that practices of strategic planning should be left out from 
strategy making? From the viewpoint of this study, no. Though the problematic 
nature of planning is clearly evident, there are reasons for organizations to 
continue these activities to some extent: the translation of strategic intent into 
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actions requires much of what is considered the strengths of strategic planning. 
Planning can increase coherence among the management or create an illusion of 
control necessary to encourage taking action in the first place. As one might 
notice, these arguments can also be presented to find fault in strategic planning — 
there are two sides to the coin. This study agrees on Mintzberg’s (1993) viewpoint 
of excessive planning as a barrier of strategic change, but is more interested in 
finding a way to combine the best of planning practices with those of strategic 
thinking. Opponents of the rational viewpoint on strategy also agree that strategic 
thinking can, in fact, partly result from participating in practices of formal 
strategic planning (Casey & Goldman 2010; Mintzberg 1993; Vaara & 
Whittington 2012). 
 
Practices of strategic thinking 
If the pitfalls of strategic planning are its excessive focus on stability, a limited 
view on the environment, and an overly rational perspective, then practices of 
strategic thinking well compensate these shortcomings. In her work Linking 
Strategic Thinking with Strategic Planning, Liedtka (1998) claims strategic 
thinking has commonly been characterized mainly as much of what strategic 
planning is not. Other authors have elaborated on this by describing strategic 
thinking as defining the vision of an organization’s future and creating new ideas 
that build competitive advantage. (Benito-Ostolaza & Sanchis-Llopis 2014) 
Liedtka’s (1998) work collects together the following attributes of a strategic 
thinker from previous literature. A strategic thinker practices:  
 
a. A systems view 
b. Focus on intent  
c. Thinking in time 
d. Hypothesis-driven 
e. Intelligently opportunistic 
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Having a systems view refers to the ability to understand the implications of one’s 
actions within the larger environment. Quoting Liedtka, "A strategic thinker has a 
mental model of the complete end-to-end system of value creation, his or her role within 
it, and an understanding of the competencies it contains.” (Liedtka 1998; Senge 1997; 
Meadows 2008) Systems thinking is focused on trying to comprehend the 
dynamics of underlying mental models and systems. While most strategic 
planning activities aim in understanding or forecasting the events these systems 
produce, a systemic point of view takes us deeper into the root causes instead. This 
viewpoint believes strategic problems originate from inside of the system itself, 
instead of being caused by the actions of competing systems. It looks into the 
organization’s internal and external dynamics to find the optimal leverage point to 
change the existing situation. Systems thinking literature argues that attempted 
transformation elsewhere than at the right leverage point results only in reluctance 
and unsustainable change. (Liedtka 1998; Fontaine 2008; Senge 1997) 
 
Focus on intent refers to the concept of strategic intent introduced earlier in this 
study. Creating an inspiring vision of the future to strive for and building 
commitment across the network of actors enables independent practices and keeps 
the focus of actions aligned with strategy. The goal of strategic intent, as Hamel 
& Prahalad (1989) define it, is to “--fold the future back into the present”. 
 
Thinking in time means being able to hold the past, present and future in mind at 
the same time. Strategy is not driven by vision alone, but continuously examines 
the gap between today’s reality and the intended future. Learning from past outcomes 
is also an important part of building strategic intent. Thinking in time can be 
incorporated into the strategic practices of an organization by using tools such as 
scenario planning and the before-mentioned methods of backcasting (Rotmans et al. 
2001) in order to find unrecognized opportunities. (Liedtka 1998) 
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Hypothesis-driven strategy making incorporates both critical and creative practices 
into the process. Strategic thinking is based on creating scientific hypothesis, then 
testing and improving on them. Creative and analytical thinking follow each other 
in sequences of hypothesis generating and testing: asking creative ‘What if?’ –
questions, then testing them with critical ‘If this, then what?’ –questions. This 
sequence allows for iterating on existing hypothesis, without restricting the 
exploration of completely new hypothesis simultaneously. This hypothesis-driven 
nature of strategic thinking is similar to that of many design practices (Kelley & 
Kelley 2012; Stevens & Moultrie 2011), as introduced earlier in this study. 
 
Intelligent opportunism stands for the practices of allowing the intended strategy to 
change: recognizing that actions beyond of what is mutually agreed upon might 
build alternative and better suitable strategies for the future. The balancing act 
between a focus on intent on one hand, and leaving room for it to change on the 
other, is what Liedtka (1998) refers to as intelligent opportunism.  
 
Liedtka’s (1998) listing of the practices of a strategic thinker is only one of the 
descriptions available, but it collects together various viewpoints from literature 
and seems most comprehensive. Bonn (2001) emphasizes having a holistic 
understanding of the organization and its environment, the value of creativity and 
a vision of the future. Senge (1997) as well uses slightly differing terms when 
describing the strategic thinking practices from an organizational point of view.  
 
Briefly concluding, strategic thinking practice is here understood as a way of 
combining several convergent (rational) and divergent (creative) practices of 
thinking and doing, in order to find new insights and seize emerging 
opportunities in the pursuit of strategic intent. (Moon 2013; Liedtka 1998; Bonn 
2001) 
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5.2.2     Practices of strategic learning 
Theory of strategic learning practices aims to explain how learning occurs at the 
strategic level. It highlights the importance of knowing how actors know what 
they claim to know — an epistemological question of what the practices that 
contribute to the understanding and dealing with problems are. Studies on 
strategic sensemaking aim to find out how both informal interactions and 
deliberate practices of framing affect various interpretations of strategic change. 
(Vaara & Whittington 2012)  
 
Strategic learning is, by the definition of Kuwada (1998): “-- organizational 
learning that improves the strategic capabilities of the organization and changes the 
basic assumptions underlying the stable generation mechanism that structures the 
strategic behavior design process.” The viewpoint sees practices of gaining and 
embracing strategic knowledge as a sustainable source of competitive advantage. 
(Thomas et al. 2001; Kuwada 1998; von Krogh et al. 2012; Nonaka et al. 2000; 
Nonaka 1991) 
 
The definition suggests that strategic learning is a process of renewal: not only 
does the strategy itself change, but the strategic practices of the organization as 
well, affecting how strategy in the future is formulated. (Kuwada 1998) It explains 
how the practices of an organization enable and constrain strategic decisions 
within the social context, and how these practices in time change to better 
respond to the needs of the system. Closely linked to the fields of knowledge 
management and organizational learning, the stream of research sees learning as 
practices that are active, explorative and creative, and that learn from outcome 
(Thomas et al. 2001) – it is learning without prejudice or questioning in advance 
(Kuwada 1998). 
 
If strategy is simultaneously created, implemented and learnt upon, as this thesis 
suggests, how might we form strategic intent in the first place? The next 
subchapter will introduce means of discourse in building a shared vision of the 
future and collective commitment to it. 
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5.3     Constructing strategic intent through discourse 
From the viewpoint of strategy-as-practice arises an interest in strategic discursive 
practices. Research has revealed that the roles and identities of actors are 
constructed through discourse, and that these discursive practices provide support 
for the legitimation of power positions of some, while marginalizing others. This 
means that certain discourses can include or exclude actors from the conversation 
of strategic intent. In the context of public governance, it is clear that these kinds 
of power relations are constructed on a continuous basis: typically it means the 
strengthening of traditional hierarchical structures, where only top management is 
involved in strategic discussion. (Vaara & Whittington 2012; Bryson & Berry 
2010) 
 
The earlier definition of strategic intent contains the notion that this discourse of 
strategy should, however, happen on all levels of the organization and within the 
larger network of actors. Intent itself cannot be held by institutions, but implies 
the active involvement of conscious actors, who both practice this strategy and 
carry out its practices. (Mantere & Sillince 2007) Organizations often are 
fragmented, and this silo-based nature of our public sector was especially 
emphasized in the OECD study on Finland introduced earlier in this thesis. 
(OECD Public Governance Reviews 2010) In building collective commitment to 
strategic vision, the actors need to be aware of the intents of other members of the 
discourse and able to relate their own intent to these. (Mantere & Sillince 2007) 
Many methods of strategic design and design thinking, as earlier discussed, aim to 
facilitate this discussion and bring visible the underlying interests and ambitions 
of each actor to others. (Seidel 2000; Boyer et al. 2011)  
 
Practices of strategic discourse are seen as both the medium in which decisions are 
discussed and the medium through which the interpretation of these discourses 
happens and strategic actions are initiated. The relationship between thought and 
action is, naturally, not always straightforward. When we look at the actions of an 
individual as outsiders, we see only the resulting action or the lack of it — we 
might not know what the mental intentions behind this action were or were not.  
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In the context of organizational and collective behavior, however, the intents of 
actors must become known in order to be shared. Strategic discourse and strategy 
texts, according to Vaara et al. (2010), have textual agency: they achieve 
something by merely their existence. Studying the prevailing practices regarding 
the discourse of intentions is, thus, an important aspect of creating commitment 
to a shared vision. (Hendry 2000; Vaara et al. 2010; Mantere & Sillince 2007) 
 
Given this basis that all actors are considered active and have their own 
perceptions of intent, the building of strategic intent becomes more about creating 
coherence between multiple simultaneous intents. A monolithic view on strategic 
intent believes, that intent is formed within top management and then diffused 
through strategic discursive practices to the whole organization. This study, 
however, follows the viewpoint of multiple intents and the promotion of practices 
aiming to gain coherence among them. (Mantere & Sillince 2007; Jarzabkowski 
& Sillince 2007) Figure 11 below illustrates this approach. In contrast to the 
hierarchical nature of the monolithic viewpoint, where typically only top 
management is responsible for the strategic practices of an organization, this 
thesis suggests that all actors in the network of public governance can and should be 
part of these discursive practices.  
 
 
 
Figure 11: The monolithic view of strategic intent vs. multiple intents in coherence.  
Mantere & Sillince 2007. 
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What, then, are the discursive practices through which we can build coherence of 
strategic intents? Mantere & Sillence (2007) propose a collection of these 
discourses and their rhetoric means in relation to strategic intent. This study 
adapts their viewpoint and also touches on the work of Jarzabkowski & Sillence 
(2007) on rhetoric, defined as the deliberate use of persuasion to influence change, as a 
means of building commitment to multiple strategic goals. The key discourses of 
building coherent strategic intent, according to Mantere & Sillince (2007) and 
Jarzabkowski & Sillince (2007) are: 
  
1. Creating purpose 
2. Building consistency 
3. Acknowledging complexity 
4. Emphasizing context  
 
Mantere & Sillence (2007) suggest that coherent strategic intent exists when the 
discursive practices of integration and differentiation are in balance. Practices of 
integration, namely creating purpose and building consistency, create an 
underlying logic for the multiple discourses of an organization, where propositions 
regarding strategy can be seen as related to each other and in an order perceived as 
temporally logical. Practices of differentiation, such as acknowledging complexity 
and emphasizing context, in contrast, bring forward the local contexts and unique 
properties of decisions and actions. (Mantere & Sillince 2007)  
 
The next pages will further introduce these four discursive practices, and the 
following list can also be considered the theoretical basis, or a loose framework, if 
you may, for the empirical study of this thesis. The findings are presented and 
interpreted in chapter seven.  
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1. Creating purpose  
A sense of purpose may be regarded the most distinctive feature of strategic 
intent. Generating purpose is an integrative practice, adding to the coherence of 
multiple strategic intents by providing reference for actors of the big picture. 
Creating purpose gives context to and legitimates the actions of an organization in 
relation to its goals and desires. Discursive practices have a focus towards a distant 
yet compelling vision of a desired future. (Mantere & Sillince 2007; Hamel & 
Prahalad 1989)  
 
The rhetoric of generating purpose aims to invoke divergent practices of strategic 
thinking and doing: innovation, experimentation and tolerating uncertainty. 
Emphasis is on tacit and unconscious ways of knowing, and the creation of shared 
ways of understanding. The practice is integrative, in that it aims to unify the 
intents of actors. (Mantere & Sillince 2007) 
 
2. Building consistency   
Jarzabkowski & Sillence (2007) argue that within the context of multiple 
simultaneous goals, rhetoric is a valuable resource in establishing links between 
goals that the actors already pursue and goals that might otherwise be seen as 
differing from their intents. Rhetoric for creating consistency addresses possible 
conflicts or dilemmas in order to build coherence. It is integrative and convergent 
in nature, bridging together facts that may seem unrelated, thus providing a 
logical frame of operation to the actors. It also aims to answer to 
counterarguments by tackling them in advance. (Mantere & Sillince 2007) 
 
Discursive practices of building consistency are used in making strategic decisions: 
to justify the selection of one strategy option over another. They can also be 
utilized in simplifying and confirming future commitments. In doing this, they 
create coherence by minimizing uncertainty of future actions and providing a 
sense of continuity. (Mantere & Sillince 2007) 
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3. Acknowledging complexity  
The discourse of what Mantere & Sillince (2007) call switching perspective aims to 
help actors in making sense of the various discourses and actions occurring 
simultaneously, in relation to and intensified by each other. In the context of this 
thesis, this practice is closely linked to the acknowledgment of wickedity and 
complex environments, as introduced in the beginning. By embracing the 
uncertainty of future and understanding the nature of multiple connections 
effecting how it turns out, the discourse of acknowledging complexity acts as a 
guide for the discussion about strategy and its practices itself. (Mantere & Sillince 
2007; Rittel & Webber 1973; Head & Alford 2008)  
 
4. Emphasizing context  
Returning to the notion of wicked problems being in need of both global and 
local solutions (Levin et al. 2012; Rittel & Webber 1973), the rhetoric for 
emphasizing context aims to construct coherence by relating the strategic 
discourse to something already familiar to the actors involved in discussion. These 
discourses emphasizing context embrace multiple alternative approaches to 
problems, acknowledging the need for local solutions. It liberates the actors to 
interpret strategic intent in ways meaningful to them: to utilize the mutual goals 
and intentions in promoting action as they see fit in their own environment. 
(Mantere & Sillince 2007; Levin et al. 2012) 
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EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
This section of the study will apply the findings of the context review and look at 
the governance of Finland through the lens of building strategic intent. The first 
part of empiric research studies the need Finnish public sector employees 
themselves perceive for strategic intent. Through an online questionnaire, the 
importance of strategic intent and the lack of it in Finland are confirmed, 
answering to the first research question. In the second part, the Government 
Programmes are assessed in relation to the discourses of building strategic intent, 
answering to the third research question of how this intent is being built in 
Finland. 
 
6     The need for strategic intent in Finnish governance 
Before moving on to analyze the Government Programmes of Finland, I wanted 
to validate my assumptions of the lack of strategic intent within public governance 
in Finland — apart from the OECD study introduced earlier in the study, I had 
found very little academic evidence for this central claim in the context of Finland 
today. In order to hear what employees in the public sector thought of the matter, 
I prepared and distributed an online questionnaire. Its aim was to find out what 
the people part of our public governance system themselves saw as problematic 
areas in their own day-to-day work. To gain a more realistic picture of how 
questions related to strategic intent were presented among other aspects of work 
in the public sector, the questionnaire topics were rather broadly set in the field of 
work community and job satisfaction (See Appendix 1a for the questionnaire). 
 
My hypothesis was that questions regarding strategic intent, i.e. the consistency of 
actions and a shared sense of purpose, would receive lower scores than those 
related to other aspects of wellbeing at work. The results, as explained in the 
following pages, were mostly consistent with this assumption and provided the 
reassurement I wished for in moving forward with this study. I also gained some 
valuable insights into the topic in the form of written comments from some of the 
respondents. These will also be presented in the following pages. 
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6.1     Online questionnaire results and analysis 
The survey gained 66 respondents during the course of three weeks, which was a 
fairly satisfying number considering the explorative and preliminary nature of this 
questionnaire. Out of these responses, 38 were from women and 29 came from 
work communities larger than one hundred people. Respondents were from both 
municipal and state levels. The gender bias can be explained by the rather one-
sided gender distribution in especially municipal jobs in Finland. According to the 
Ministry of Finance, 77% of employees in municipalities are women 
(Valtiovarainministeriö 2006). The size of work communities is relevant in 
relation to the question of forming mutual strategic intent: research suggests that 
cohesiveness tends to reduce in larger groups. (Mullen & Copper 1994) The 
sample size of this survey was too small to make conclusions on the effect of 
community size on experienced cohesiveness, but the worst grades received on 
statements regarding cohesive goals were in fact received from respondents part of 
a large (over 100 people) work community. 
 
The results were collected and analyzed by coding the 7-point Likert scale into 
numbers ranging from -3 to 3 (where 1 on the Likert scale is -3, the midpoint 
answer of 4 on the scale is 0, and 7 on the scale is 3) and then counting the mean 
value for each statement. This provided an easy way to see which statements 
received negative and which positive grades. The method also eliminated 
midpoint answers (“Neither agree nor disagree”) from the results, as they had no 
effect on the mean answer. Appendix 1a shows the comprehensive results of 
analysis.  
 
The results showed several clear issues to address within public management 
organizations, but on the other hand some aspects received very good grades. Out 
of the 38 statements, the following three distinctively received the worst grading. 
All of their mean values were clearly negative, meaning that more people 
disagreed with the original statement than agreed. These statements are presented 
here in order and accompanied by a short analysis.  
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1. My work community is bureaucratic in nature.  
Bureaucracy itself is not good or bad in nature by default (Koll 2009; 
Peters 2009). Its purpose is to maintain stability and order — a two-sided 
issue in our time of wickedity and rapid change (Osborne 2007; Peters 
2009). Finland has consistently been in among the top countries in 
studies on the quality of bureaucracy: when there is a process for doing 
something, it is done remarkably well (Van de Walle 2005; Boyle 2007). 
According to research, a moderate level of bureaucracy is also beneficial in 
building trust between the government (as an employer) and the public 
sector employee (Koivumäki & Pyöriä 2013). However, given the context 
of this study and the counterproductive nature of bureaucracy in relation 
to enhancing innovation (Osborne 2007), in this case I have interpreted 
the high amount of bureaucracy experienced to be “too much of a good 
thing”. The need for extensive bureaucracy decreases when an 
organization shares strategic intent: its actions are naturally guided 
towards the same direction, even without specific guidelines of operation 
(Osborne 2007; Floyd & Wooldridge 1992). 
 
2. Some members of my work community pursue their own agendas instead of our 
common goals. 
This notion of conflicting personal and organizational goals shows that 
while there is no lack of strategy making in public organizations, the 
commitment to pursue a common strategy in practice is not at the level of 
strategic intent. Weak consensus may result from a lack of understanding 
or simply from personal disagreement with a ‘top-down’ given strategy. 
Strategic intent is created in a process where both understanding and 
commitment are built through conversation around strategy on all 
organizational levels. This means that by definition, organizations with 
strategic intent carry a truly mutual agenda. (Floyd & Wooldridge 1992; 
Mantere & Sillince 2007) 
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3. My work is guided by conflicting instructions. 
An organization continuously providing conflicting directions to its 
employees strongly implies the lack of coherent strategy (Osborne 2007). 
Strategic intent by definition means, that there is a real agreement on the 
priorities of the organization. Management on different levels and across 
units should thus have a shared understanding on how the agreed strategy 
will be pursued — often consensus is not specific enough, and thus 
conflicting viewpoints and instructions occur. (Floyd & Wooldridge 
1992) The flip side to this issue is to find a midpoint in consensus 
building and allowing room for new viewpoints to emerge. The 
innovation network approach discussed earlier suggests that a certain 
amount of autonomy and distributed decision-making power is necessary 
in order to allow for innovation. (Bland et al. 2010) 
 
Other issues closely linked to the apparent lack of strategic intent were questions 
of the ability to affect decisions regarding your own work and the goals of the 
work community, the culture of learning from failure and actively seeking to try 
new methods and ways of doing work. All these statements received poor grades, 
standing out from the questions related to other aspects of work.   
 
In addition to assessing statements on the Likert scale, respondents were able to 
freely leave written notes or comments. These written notes turned out to be the 
most interesting findings of the survey: I received valid comments on the 
challenges these public sector employees themselves have identified. Surprisingly 
many of these comments also support my central hypothesis of the importance of 
strategic intent — the survey could have prompted many other viewpoints on 
work communities as well, but nearly all of the comments were somehow related 
to strategic choices and management. The comments quoted here have been 
translated into English, and the original comments in Finnish can be found in 
Appendix 1b. 
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(1) “My work community and its employees are strategically skilled. Management, 
however, has major problems. Prevailing favoritism undermines the effectiveness 
and direction of work and the success of strategy: one person gets to do what they 
want at the expense of collective work.” 
 
Further elaborating the survey result of some members of work communities 
pursuing their own agendas over mutual goals, this comment clearly points into 
the direction of a lack of cohesive strategy and the commitment to pursue it. 
Conflicts and disagreements on the managerial level are quickly reflected to the 
whole work community: when decisions are made according to personal 
preferences and not mutual goals, the commitment of others may also suffer 
(Floyd & Wooldridge 1992). 
 
(2) “Although you may see the effects of your own actions in the future, not 
everyone in practice has the possibility to bring forward their viewpoints. A poorly 
future-oriented agency kills the desire of future-oriented people to bring forward 
their own views.” 
 
This comment implies the exclusion of some members of the organization from 
strategic conversation. Given that transition management is a future-oriented 
approach, it is concerning in the scope of this study to hear that the forward-
looking activities of all members of the community are not fully supported.  
 
(3) “In Finland we don’t know how to lead in a goal-directed manner. There are 
some good leaders, though. Finnish public administration has the kind of trust in 
and autonomy of officials, that achieving change is very difficult. If you compare 
the public and private sectors, the fact that public sector work has no ’products’ 
leads to a lack of goals and hence inefficiency. At the same time, the public sector 
highly values the know-how of people and their personal development.” 
 
The comment illustrates the difficulty of generating change on the regime level: 
the established ways of doing are often regarded ‘good enough’, and the autonomy 
of other actors supported. This might partly result of the wish for one’s own work 
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to not be disrupted in turn. The comment does, however, recognize the respect 
that public sector organizations have for developing new capabilities. 
 
(4) “I currently have mixed emotions — reforms are implemented according to 
charts and the personal preferences of managers, not according to the needs of people 
who use the services, i.e. clients, i.e. the citizen.” 
 
The comment above reminds of an important notion regarding the role of 
government as a facilitator — not only public sector employees as members of the 
organization, but citizens as clients should be involved in the creation of strategic 
intent. When structural renewals are planned and implemented without 
considering the needs of the most important user group of citizens, this should 
raise red flags within the system. 
 
(5) “Doing work in projects and having project-based funding has gone too far. 
Instead of dealing with these disconnected small projects, we should seek for 
continuity. Another critical issue is the continuous organizational changes. The 
costs of these reforms are ignored, while the benefits may be left relatively minor. 
Does it make sense to put so much money into muddling up structures — shouldn’t 
we rather develop the content of work.” 
 
Lastly, the importance of concentrating on content instead of formal structures is 
highlighted. Disconnected projects are a real issue in the public sector, where the 
responsibilities of actors might overlap but opportunities for collaboration are 
often not encouraged by budgeting or steering systems. 
 
The survey results clearly validated my argument of forming strategic intent 
within the government and the network of actors as a crucial issue that should be 
addressed. Next, the main empirical study of this thesis will explore how these 
rhetoric practices are present in Government Programmes. 
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7     The key discourses of strategic intent in Government 
       Programmes 
The seven Government Programmes were first read through in an overall analysis 
to identify how the key discourses, relevant to my framing of the mechanisms of 
creating strategic intent, were generally present in the material. Some of the 
discourses were present in only part of the documents, and others became 
increasingly common towards the more recent programmes. Table 3 below shows 
the frequencies of the key discourses occurred. The occurring of a discourse was 
defined by the number of distinct times the discourse appeared on the 
Programme. For instance, the discourse of purpose was only present in the 
introduction segments of earlier Government Programmes, and its presence 
throughout the whole document grew towards the more recent texts. 
 
Government 
program 
 
Year Purpose Consistency Aknowledging 
complexity 
Emphasizing 
context 
Katainen — 
Stubb 
2011 and 
2014 22 0 17 4 
Vanhanen II — 
Kiviniemi 
2007 and 
2010 17 0 19 1 
Jäätteenmäki — 
Vanhanen I 2003 12 0 14 3 
Lipponen II 1999 9 0 4 2 
Lipponen I 1995 8 0 6 2 
Aho 1991 4 0 6 0 
Holkeri 1987 6 0 5 3 
 
Table 3: The frequencies of strategic intent discourses present in the Government Programmes. 
 
In addition to the key discourses of creating strategic intent, few other themes 
stood out when reading the material. These were mainly related to the growing 
amount of discourse on innovation, design, and collaboration. They can be seen to 
strongly relate to one or more of the key discourses, but will also be separately 
examined in this chapter. The growth of discourses on innovation and 
collaboration were especially interesting from the viewpoint of this thesis and the 
idea of innovation networks. I have treated collaboration within the government, 
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with the private sector and with civil society (citizen and third sector organizations) 
each as their own discourse. Table 4 below illustrates the growth of these 
discourses. 
 
Government 
program 
 
Year Collaboration 
within government 
Collaboration with 
the private sector 
Collaboration 
with civil society  
Katainen — 
Stubb 
2011 and 
2014 27 8 15 
Vanhanen II — 
Kiviniemi 
2007 and 
2010 15 4 9 
Jäätteenmäki — 
Vanhanen I 2003 14 2 6 
Lipponen II 1999 8 3 4 
Lipponen I 1995 3 2 2 
Aho 1991 5 5 1 
Holkeri 1987 7 0 0 
 
 
Table 4: The frequencies of collaboration discourses in the Government Programmes. 
 
In assessing the discourse of innovation, I have distinguished two discourses: one 
of innovation and experiments, and another of design methodology (see Table 5 
on the next page). My interest in seeing how design methodology is treated in the 
discussion initiated by the public sector itself aims to contribute to the ways 
design education and professionals may communicate their viewpoints on the 
benefits of involving design on the strategic level of policymaking. The two 
discourses seem to rather significantly differ in the sense that innovations and 
experiments are quite explicitly present in the programmes, while design 
methodology is more implicitly involved. In other words, the discourse on design 
for governance is not yet established in the vocabulary of public sector decision 
makers, though some ideas stemming from it are involved in conversation. 
Design, when mentioned by name in the programmes, is still mainly understood 
as the ‘traditional design field’ of industrial and graphic design. 
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Government 
program 
 
Year Innovation and 
experiments 
Design 
methodology 
Katainen — 
Stubb 
2011 and 
2014 23 6 
Vanhanen II — 
Kiviniemi 
2007 and 
2010 15 4 
Jäätteenmäki — 
Vanhanen I 2003 10 3 
Lipponen II 1999 6 3 
Lipponen I 1995 2 2 
Aho 1991 0 1 
Holkeri 1987 1 0 
 
Table 5: The frequencies of innovation & experiments and design discourses in the  
Government Programmes. 
 
The structural format for a Government Programme has, especially since the 
document produced by the Government of Lipponen in 1995, remained relatively 
unchanged. The length of programmes has, however, grown in ten-fold: from the 
8 pages of Holkeri’s Government to 80 pages in the programme of Katainen. This 
aligns with the findings of OHRA Project on the programmes having too many 
and too detailed objectives: the earlier programmes were more general in nature 
and thus more concise. This must also be considered in interpreting the tables on 
this and the previous pages: though the absolute number of times each discourse is 
present in the text might grow, this does not necessarily imply a relative growth in 
the importance of the discourse within each Government Programme. To 
illustrate this relative stability of discourses, Figure 12 on the next page shows the 
frequencies of discourses standardized by the length of Government Programmes. 
The programme of Holkeri was used as the basis of standardization, so that all 
discourses can be examined in relation to their development through time. Each 
value thus represents the frequency of the discourse, would it appear in the eight-
page length of the first programme studied. 
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Figure 12: The standardized frequencies of strategic intent –related discourses in the  
Government Programmes. 
 
The figure above reveals that although the frequencies of the discourses in 
absolute numbers have grown, their relative importance in discussion has in fact 
mostly declined. The more recent Government Programmes may well include most 
key discourses of building strategic intent, but this message is easily lost amongst 
all the other discussions going on. The nature of government formation talks can 
be interpreted to have moved on towards the handling of tactical details, instead 
of generating strategic discussion. This is supported by the findings of OHRA 
Project, as earlier mentioned. 
 
These nine discourses will be discussed in more detail over the next subchapters. 
Before getting into the discourses themselves, the general style and tone of voice 
in the Government Programmes will be briefly described. 
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7.1     The overall style and tone of voice 
All Government Programmes follow a similar structure: definitions of policy are 
arranged in separate chapters, loosely following the division of ministries. Titles 
such as foreign, industrial, economic, welfare and educational policies are present 
in all. Each programme also ends in a section discussing the development of 
administration itself. Some programmes are divided under more detailed 
headlines than others. 
 
A few distinctive features regarding the tone of voice of the Government 
Programmes stood out. They will be briefly analyzed following the discursive 
attributes identified by Vaara et al. (2010) in their research on the formulation of 
strategy. The next pages will introduce these findings, and the following 
subchapters then go on to discuss the presence of the four key discourses. 
 
Forced consensus 
The tone of voice in all programmes is strongly one of forced consensus. According 
to Vaara et al. (2010), forced consensus is driven by the need to reach unanimity. 
The purpose of the government formation talks is, indeed, to find agreement 
necessary to move on with forming the next Cabinet — the context for the 
discourse of forced consensus to form is favorable by definition. However, this 
style of documenting government plans as if they were unanimously agreed upon 
gives a false impression of the discussions during government formation talks.  
 
There arguably must have been disagreements or even heated discussions between 
the representatives of different political parties, especially on questions where the 
core values or beliefs of parties significantly differ. Reaching agreement in such 
questions is often achieved through finding new meanings together to 
accommodate differing viewpoints under the same terminology. Presenting the 
results of discussion in a voice of forced consensus, however, serves as a formal 
closure of discussion. When the agreed definition of terminology and the discussion 
behind the agreement are not visible to the reader, the meaning of the document 
to those not involved in the writing process can be very different than to those 
who were. Important aspects are lost in translation, yet the document adds to the 
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power of the plan itself: it claims to represent the mutually agreed objectives of 
high-level decision-makers. Questions of ideology are, however, not apparent 
from the text, and thus the need for having elaborate value discussions around the 
programme continues long after government formation talks.  
 
This discourse of forced consensus is visible in the Government Programmes in 
most of their choices of words. Most sentences start by defining the actor as 
‘Finland’ or ‘The Government’. The Government is seen as a unified subject 
acting as one:  phrases stating  “The Government will...” or “The Government’s goal 
is to...” occur in almost every paragraph. 
 
Deonticity 
Another characteristic feature of the Government Programmes is the imperative 
form used in describing goals and plans. Deonticity means the obligatory nature 
and a ‘so-be-it’ component of discourse. Though at first the tone of voice may 
seem purely declarative, considered in the context of the programmes, which is to 
guide future actions, it shifts to obligations for the administration. (Vaara et al. 
2010) Examples of deonticity are present in all programmes, in the form of 
sentences like the following: 
 
(1) “ This will have a positive impact on both central and general government 
finances--.” 
(Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen’s Cabinet 2011) 
 
(2) “Public administration will coordinate and monitor more effectively the 
funding of basic public services and local government finances.” 
(Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen’s Cabinet 2003) 
 
Both strategic goals and tactical direction can be considered as orders to the 
administrative levels of governance. The Government Programme is the basis for 
all subsequent decision-making during the term of office of Cabinets, and thus 
has textual agency as earlier described.  Like forced consensus, deonticity acts as 
closure to the discussion — what has been decided will become. 
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Self-authorization and strategic terminology 
The final notion regarding the style and tone of Government Programmes is the 
mechanisms of self-authorization used in the documents. This means the use of 
strategy to communicate its own importance, i.e. referring to the strategy itself 
within text. This forms the prerequisites for textual agency, implying that the 
document in itself is an important tool in achieving desired outcomes. Some 
referrals were direct, while most appeared in more subtle form:  
 
(3) “A long-term language strategy will be prepared under the lead of the Prime 
Minister in order to develop two viable national languages, and, on this basis, 
concrete measures will be specified for the Government’s term of office.” 
 
(4) “Each ministry will prepare an intelligent strategy, including targets and 
steering methods, at the beginning of this Government’s term of office.” 
(Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen’s Cabinet 2011) 
 
The quotes above imply that strategy comes first and actions follow in order to 
implement it. The importance of strategy is highlighted by the fact that the Prime 
Minister himself and the ministries will lead the strategy processes, and that the 
concrete measures to follow are based on these strategies. This provides a sound 
basis for textual agency, also accentuating the power relations of politicians versus 
administration: the Cabinet formulates strategy, and the implementation of it lies 
within the responsibilities of administration. 
 
Finally, the use of strategic terminology in the programmes has become more 
common towards the newer documents. Terminology such as ‘predictive systems’, 
‘risk analysis methods’, ‘intelligence’ and ‘scorecard system’ is used to describe the 
different phases of the strategy process and its implementation. This, according to 
Vaara et al. (2010), can be also seen to have certain implications to the power 
relations during government formation talks. Those skilled in the vocabulary of 
strategy making may have had more say in these topics: most participants are not 
highly experienced in strategic management per se, and may have encountered 
some of this terminology for the first time in their lives.  
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The latest Government Programme of Prime Minister Sipilä in 2015 differs from 
the previous programmes significantly in this particular area. The programme 
itself contains a vision statement for 2025 and a SWOT analysis prepared during 
the government formation talks, taking the discourse to a clearly more managerial 
direction. Vocabulary used in the programme is also notably oriented towards self-
authorizing strategy. This can be partly explained by implemented suggestions of 
OHRA Project considering the content of Government Programmes, and partly 
by the educational and professional background of Prime Minister Sipilä in 
engineering and especially in management within the private sector.   
 
Next, the four key discourses (purpose, consistency, complexity and context) and 
the five additional discourses of creating strategic intent will be discussed.  
 
 
7.2     Creating purpose  
The discourse of creating purpose, as described earlier, aims to provide reference 
to the bigger picture and relate agendas to the ultimate goals pursued. It can be 
used to legitimate decisions and actions, and it aims to unify the intents of various 
actors. (Mantere & Sillince 2007; Hamel & Prahalad 1989)  
 
Despite the supposedly central role of the Government in building strategic 
intent, the discourse for building mutual intent has begun to show only within the 
recent couple of programmes. The introductory chapter of each Government 
Programme starting from PM Lipponen’s first Cabinet is a vision statement 
providing broad goals for the term of office. Until PM Vanhanen’s second 
Cabinet, these are mainly goals for government itself, rather than long-term 
visions for the whole of Finland.  
 
The older programmes set vague yet somewhat unenthusiastic goals for the 
Cabinet: to improve employment opportunities, increase gender equality, and take 
principles of sustainable development better into account, for instance. Without 
undermining the importance of these goals, this is not discourse on the level of 
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strategic intent. Objectives are short-term and concentrate on what the current 
Government can realistically achieve.  
 
The newer programmes do contain mentions of higher-level strategies to pursue: 
the second Cabinet of PM Vanhanen already illustrates a certain shift in thinking, 
and states that Finland can “--both prosper and also shoulder its share of responsibility 
for finding solutions to global problems.” These programmes from the 21st century 
each have a ‘catchphrase’ aimed to describe the most important goals of the 
Cabinet. Examples of these are “A responsible, caring and rewarding Finland” from 
PM Vanhanen’s second Cabinet, and “An open, fair and confident Finland” from 
the Cabinet of PM Katainen. The underlying values of the Cabinet are spelled 
out to some extent, and provide a basis for the discussion of goals. Programmes 
also provide a viewpoint to what the core values of Finland are according to the 
Cabinet, characterizing the society in positive terms such as respect, openness and 
solidarity. 
 
These visionary statements, however, occur mainly in the introductory chapter of 
documents. The text in other chapters is rarely related to the vision itself, 
providing no clear connection between the long-term desired state and the actions 
declared for implementation. This leaves tactical level incentives rather unattached 
and without explicit information of the basis on which decisions are made. A lot is 
left for the reader to interpret on this part, which also provides the chance for 
using these statements to one’s own purposes and disregarding the meanings 
initially built in. Mostly these documents consist of objectives that are not 
strategic but neither are they detailed enough to be considered an action plan. 
They can be best described as tactical agendas, but left without a strategy to relate 
them together, they do not build a discourse of purpose. 
 
The programme of PM Katainen’s Cabinet showed some improvement within 
this area by using a more explanatory tone of voice than the previous programmes. 
Many of the paragraphs in this particular Government Programme start by stating 
the goal, and then explaining the actions needed to pursue it. For example: 
 
 85 
(5) “In order to combat youth unemployment, inequality, and social exclusion, each 
young person will be provided with a workplace or a place in education, 
rehabilitation or apprenticeship training.” 
(Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen’s Cabinet 2011) 
 
The quote above provides the reader a bigger goal: combating youth 
unemployment, inequality and social exclusion. It then moves on to describe the 
action needed to tackle this problem: providing each young person a place to 
study, rehabilitate or work. However, most of the document consists of detailed 
short-term actions and multiple objectives, leaving the reader to do their own 
prioritizing of these goals to pursue. 
 
A focus on future? 
An important part of building a mutual sense of purpose is the kind of future-first 
thinking introduced earlier in this thesis. The Government Programmes, 
however, tend to have an emphasis on the near future or at times even the past. A 
discourse on the long-term future past the term of office is completely absent 
from most parts of the programmes, and strategies tend to build strongly upon 
past experiences. For instance, PM Vanhanen’s first programme promises to “-- 
further develop the welfare state and society built up successfully through broad 
cooperation in previous decades.” PM Katainen’s newer programme introduces the 
idea of building predictive systems through various risk analysis methods. While 
this is certainly a future-oriented approach, the rational choice of methods may be 
questioned on the basis of what we earlier discovered on the nature of wickedity. 
 
(6) “Predictive systems for structural change will be developed by 
enhancing collaboration between various administrative sectors and by 
introducing new risk analysis methods.” 
(Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen’s Cabinet 2011) 
 
As an exception to the general tone and discourse of purpose, all Government 
Programmes starting from PM Lipponen’s second Cabinet in 1999 have 
envisioned the future of Finland as the forerunner of information societies. Here, 
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high hopes are nurtured on the becoming of a success story, and clear intention 
stated:   
 
(7) “The objective of the active information society policy is to transform Finland 
into an internationally recognized, competitive competence-based service society 
with a human touch.” 
(Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen’s second Cabinet 2007) 
 
Elsewhere in the programmes, some vague references to how things are suspected 
to develop past the term of office are made. For example, the Government 
Programme of PM Katainen’s Cabinet discusses the future needs of fitting 
together work and family life. The programme then goes on to state that the 
government will promote ‘procedures based on good practices’ to make places of 
employment more family-friendly. As in most occasions, the programme here 
leaves very little room for alternative solutions to be innovated: when it does 
present a problem to be solved, it almost always provides a tactical answer or 
guideline, or claims responsibility of coming up with a solutions as well. The 
ultimate goal of building purpose, according to Mantere & Sillince (2007), is to 
invoke capabilities such as innovation, risk taking or uncertainty absorption. By 
providing more answers than open questions, the Government risks repressing the 
proactivity of both administration and the civil society and private sector.  
 
The current programme of PM Sipilä approaches the issue head-on by using 
scenario tools and providing the Cabinet’s view of Finland in 2025. Reportedly, 
future scenarios were of high importance during the government formation talks, 
although the programme itself again shows only the end result of these 
discussions. In each chapter, the programme sets ten-year objectives in addition to 
those for the term of government. This can be considered a significant step on the 
way towards a truly future-focused way of generating strategy, though the quality 
of scenario planning carried out by the participants has been questioned by some. 
Most of the document is, still, rather detailed description of the actions the new 
Government is planning to take. The generation of a shared purpose is not a forte 
of the Government Programmes, while my suggestion is that it should be. 
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7.3     Building consistency  
The discourse of building consistency is closely linked to that of creating purpose. 
Similarly, it aims to add to coherence and provide arguments for choosing one 
option over others. It addresses the contradictions and conflicts within text, fitting 
together seemingly unrelated statements. In contrast to the visionary tone of 
creating purpose, the tone of building consistency can be described as logical and 
reasoning. (Mantere & Sillince 2007)  
 
According to my interpretation, the rhetoric of consistency is completely absent 
from all Government Programmes. This finding is supported by the earlier 
recognition of forced consensus and deonticity as characteristic rhetoric features: 
no alternatives and rare explanations are given to argue for the statements, but 
they are rather presented as the unanimous truth. The programmes do not contain 
contradicting viewpoints when addressing issues, but aim to provide one coherent 
view. They also fail to provide reasoning for their central systemic assumptions on 
how the world works, but state them as matter-of-facts. The following excerpts 
act as examples of how statements of initiated action typically follow one after the 
other in the Government Programmes: 
 
(8) “Ways will be sought to improve the availability of public dental care. The 
overall situation and development needs of occupational health care, emergency 
care and ambulance services will also be examined. Measures that would improve 
the predictability of the costs of specialized medical care will also be surveyed. Ways 
in which municipalities could transfer financial liability for extra expensive 
treatments to central government will be surveyed.” 
(Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen’s Cabinet 2003) 
 
The tone of voice is extremely deontic and that of a forced consensus. The 
statements are declared as describing what will happen, and they are not explained 
in any way or related to the bigger picture. Most of the newer Government 
Programmes since the programme of PM Vanhanen’s first Cabinet similarly 
follow this style of documenting the tactical implementation of their vision. 
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(9) “The Government will take active steps for the management of 
structural change situations. The employment-based investment allocations will 
be used to create replacement jobs. Simultaneously, new operating methods 
and financing models will be developed for managing structural change 
situations. The operating model for restructuring protection will be developed 
further to support employment of those who have been made redundant.” 
(Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen’s Cabinet 2011) 
 
The declarative tone of voice in Government Programmes may be at times 
mistaken for building consistency, but on closer inspection is revealed to provide 
rather one-sided (if any) arguments to the issues discussed. The reader might not 
always recognize possible inconsistencies within the strategy and its tactical 
implementations, as the overall style is to present declarations one by one without 
clearly binding them together.  
 
Government Programmes have indeed been criticized for stating one thing while 
initiating action in a counterproductive manner. For example, the new programme 
of PM Sipilä’s Cabinet within days after its publication has awoken criticism on 
the inconsistency experienced between the strategic goal of raising the national 
level of education and becoming a world-wide leader in modern learning 
techniques, and the actions it later proposes on introducing significant budget cuts 
on education. Had the Government Programme utilized rhetorical means of 
building consistency, the reader might have been provided a better understanding 
on the kind of reasoning the actions stem from.  
 
The aim of creating consistency is not to shut out differing viewpoints, but to 
bring visible the path of decision-making. The complete lack of reasoning within 
Government Programmes may be seen to in fact cause more resistance than the 
presentation of differing viewpoints would. The lack of adequate argumentation 
can be also seen to stem from the power gap embedded deeply in the decision-
making system. If the concept of an active network of innovators stemming across 
the private sector, civil society, and all levels of government was truly seen as the 
preferred way of organizing decision-making power, more attention would be 
paid in opening up the reasoning logic behind decisions for others to question and 
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build upon. As the statements in Government Programmes now are formulated, 
they leave a lot of implicit knowledge or thinking unsaid, simultaneously 
undermining the ability of other members of the policy network to think in terms 
of strategic decisions.  
 
 
7.4     Acknowledging complexity  
The discourse of acknowledging wickedity and complex environments embraces 
the uncertainty of future and understands the nature of multiple connections 
effecting how it turns out. As stated earlier, it acts as a guide for the discussion 
about strategy itself: creating coherence by regulating the conversation. (Mantere 
& Sillince 2007) 
 
The concept of complexity has been increasingly present in the Government 
Programmes, and is often mentioned in connection to global issues. 
Interdependency, environmental, economic and security issues are also commonly 
repeated in the discourse. All programmes after PM Holkeri’s Cabinet in 1987 
have somehow addressed the wicked nature of policy problems, if only stating it in 
the introductory paragraphs. The following excerpts illustrate the way complexity 
is typically presented in the programmes. 
 
(10) “The Government is beginning its work in an unusually 
demanding international situation, which also casts a shadow over future 
economic growth.” 
(Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen’s Cabinet 2003) 
 
(11) “Climate change and globalization reinforce the inter-dependence between 
nations and citizens.” 
(Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen’s second Cabinet 2007)  
 
The first excerpt reveals the rather old-fashioned rational logic behind strategy-
making: the turbulent global situation is seen as something extraordinary, 
implying that things will return to ‘normal’. This assumption that rational 
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decisions will swing the nation’s situation back to what it has been is used as a 
basis to justify decisions made in the programmes. In the contrary to what 
complexity theories state, and to the philosophical grounds of this study, 
Government Programmes seem to communicate the assumption that good 
governance can gain control of these complex situations. Rather than embracing 
the complexity, the documents could be characterized as generally cautious of it. 
 
The underlying idea of complexity is present in more subtle ways as well. Many 
programmes contain sections especially in relation to questions of the 
environment and economy, where the recognized need for cross-disciplinary 
thinking shows. The following excerpt talks of promoting sustainable 
development, and identifies economic means (tax reforms) as an important tool in 
the matter listed under environmental politics.  
 
(12) “The structure of taxation will be revised so as to promote sustainable 
development. Ecological tax reforms will reduce the use of non-renewable natural 
resources and prevent environmental damage.” 
(Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen’s Cabinet 2003) 
 
There is, however, a tendency to ‘dumb’ down or ‘tame’ these wicked issues. The 
need experienced by governments to provide ready-made solutions to everything 
is rather overpowering — a statement may first acknowledge that the issue at 
hand is indeed complex and incontrollable, but the next statement already claims a 
solution. The answer to tackling complex issues is seen as simple as engineering a 
system or a set of protocols to follow by. The following excerpt shows how a 
systematic approach to the increasing complexity of the environment is seen as the 
solution: 
 
(13) “In an interdependent world, many security challenges – such as climate 
change, uncontrolled migratory flows, poverty and inequality, epidemics, 
international crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), 
terrorism and cyber attacks – require systematic preparedness consistent with the 
comprehensive concept of security.” 
(Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen’s Cabinet 2011) 
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One could, indeed, argue that the discourse of complexity is not truly present in 
the Government Programmes, if the concept of wicked problems is understood as 
merely somewhat more challenging issues than others. There still seems to be a 
lack of understanding on the nature of wickedity and the required approaches to 
dealing with it.  
 
Taking global responsibility 
Hand-in-hand with the discussion on complexity, the recognition of Finland’s 
role within the global community has also grown in the Government 
Programmes. The earliest programme studied here of PM Holkeri in 1987 barely 
addressed the country’s role in solving problems not directly affecting Finland 
through monetary aid to developing countries. The recent programmes of PM 
Vanhanen and Katainen, on the other hand, clearly state the importance of 
contributing to the solving of global issues in other ways as well: 
 
(14) “The Government will take an active part in the global debate on 
innovative funding mechanisms and debt relief programmes for developing 
countries. In development cooperation, emphasis must be placed on the efficiency 
and effectiveness of work, the division of labor between various donors and the 
recipient countries' ownership.” 
(Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen’s second Cabinet 2007) 
 
Here, however, the mechanisms of innovating new solutions are also seen as ones 
in need of strict structure and control. Efficiency and effectiveness are not bad 
measures of innovation, but neither do they support the search for novel solutions 
per se. No mention of the role of Finland as the initiator of building international 
networks of innovators is present, and though the active role of Finland in debate 
is emphasized, there are no concrete examples of the actions the nation will take 
in order to pursue the generation of globally sustainable innovations.  
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7.5     Emphasizing context  
The discourse of context aims to build coherence by relating the strategy to 
something already familiar to the actors involved in discussion. It embraces 
multiple alternative approaches to problems, and recognizes the need for local 
solutions. It also allows for multiple interpretations of the strategic intent to form, 
where actors utilize the mutual goals and intentions in promoting action as they 
see fit in their own environment. (Mantere & Sillince 2007)  
 
This discourse of emphasizing context-specific solutions is somewhat present in 
all but the programme of PM Aho in 1991. No significant growth has, however, 
happened. Mostly it occurs in relation to local development, where the autonomy 
of public sector actors has gradually been added in most sectors over the past 
decades. The decentralizing of decision-making has during the last ten to fifteen 
years been followed by the adoption of regional models, where power is yet again 
centralized to decision-making structures mediating between local actors and the 
state level. This introduction of regional actors may have hindered the growth of 
the discourse of context, as the focus of discussion has been on finding more 
efficient use of the resources in public administration by joining functions. The 
two excerpts below illustrate the common ways context-specificity is present:  
 
(15) “In addition to promoting nationwide goals, the state’s decision-making 
concerning regional and local government, steering, and targeting of regional 
development resources will emphasize the regional development approach, 
observing the special characteristics of each region.” 
(Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen’s Cabinet 2011) 
 
(16) “The Government will provide adequate resources for the decentralization of 
the Agency for Rural Affairs by increasing the appropriations where necessary and 
take steps to guarantee the operative capabilities of the local rural 
administration.” 
(Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen’s second Cabinet 2007) 
 
However, this discourse can be claimed to be more about recognizing the need for 
local or rural decision-making than about relating the bigger mutual innovation 
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goals to these local contexts. Speaking in terms of truly understanding the idea of 
empowered local communities working within the network of public sector 
innovation towards mutual objectives, the frequencies of this discourse in 
Government Programmes would be near zero. Some exceptions may occur, as in 
the following excerpt from the second Cabinet of PM Vanhanen. Here the 
discussion of rural development offers the solution of creating a nationwide 
network to support local activities, thus implying that these local innovations may 
have great significance to their context-specific birthplace. The degree to which 
this implied meaning was intended by the Cabinet to be present is still uncertain 
— it might as well be that the purpose of a nationwide network mentioned is to 
clearly control rather than facilitate. The determination of this is difficult from the 
text, given the matter-of-fact tone of voice it contains.  
 
(17) “Under the new Rural Development Programme, efforts will be made to 
promote rural microenterprises, develop decentralized bioenergy production and 
create the necessary prerequisites for innovative local activities, including village 
development, advisory services and training. The Government will establish an 
extensive nationwide advisory network with regional information offices to 
promote decentralized bioenergy production.” 
(Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen’s second Cabinet 2007) 
 
Where the importance of local development is clearly understood, is in connection 
to housing policies and area development. This is a natural place for the discourse 
of context to occur, as the residential development of regions has for long been 
rather autonomous.  Decisions regarding the development of housing options are 
also context-specific by default, as the geographical and historical guidelines are a 
given to each location and have significant affect on how the building of new areas 
can be pursued overall. The following excerpt illustrates the recognition of 
context-specific decision-making in connection to new housing projects.  
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(18) “An inter-sectorial programme will be launched to improve resident 
satisfaction in housing projects in an attempt to prevent segregation and increase 
the competitiveness of the areas while diversifying and upgrading the properties. 
In particular, efforts will be made to encourage local action.” 
(Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen’s second Cabinet 2007) 
 
The definition of the discourse of context states that it allows for multiple 
interpretations to occur. This, as earlier introduced, is not the case in Government 
Programmes. The rhetoric of forced consensus is so overpowering that the idea of 
generating local solutions communicates as a top-down forced initiative, aiming 
to simply increase the efficiency of policymaking. The pursuit of truly innovative 
and engaged local communities is not visible from the programmes, and neither is 
the allowance of multiple different solutions to be developed to solve national or 
even regional problems. 
 
 
7.6     Initiating collaboration 
In addition to the four key discourses of strategic intent, the discourse of 
collaboration came up during analysis. It is particularly interesting in relation to 
my earlier suggestion of public sector innovation activities being organized in 
networks, stemming across the silos of government and involving the civil society 
and public sector as well. These three aspects of collaboration within the 
government, with the private sector and with the civil society will each be shortly 
assessed on their own in this subchapter. 
 
 95 
7.6.1     Collaboration within government 
To partly counterbalance the trend of decentralized policymaking on local and 
regional levels, the discourse of collaboration within the public sector has been 
increasingly present in the Government Programmes. Most programmes 
recognize the need for collaboration between the various levels of government, and 
initiatives for working across the silos of disciplines are also more and more present.  
 
The discourse of collaboration within governance is clearly present in connection 
to the development of new initiatives: in the following excerpts, the two Cabinets 
of PM Vanhanen broadly elaborate on the importance of integrative actions 
between ministries to address migration and integration issues. The latter 
programme proposes the formation of a new unit responsible of these matters. 
 
(19) “ The Government is prepared to develop immigration policy and 
integration measures. The demographic trend in Finland will result in an entirely 
new situation within this decade due to the ageing of the population and 
the declining workforce. If the economic dependency ratio so requires, Government 
policy will promote immigration in support of labor supply. This will require 
extensive cooperation and commitment between central and local government, 
the business sector, the social partners and NGOs.” 
(Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen’s Cabinet 2003) 
 
(20) “For the new entity to be formed within the Ministry of the Interior, a special 
unit for integration will be created which, in the discharge of its duties, will work 
in close collaboration with the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Health, the future Ministry of Labor and Industry, and the Ministry 
of the Environment. The unit will support the ministry in shouldering general 
responsibility for integration issues and related coordination. The importance of 
smooth cooperation between the individual ministries is underlined in the 
implementation of the reform for the purpose of developing work-related 
immigration, etc.” 
(Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen’s second Cabinet 2007) 
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The topic of immigration in particular has evoked the pursuit of inter-
organizational collaboration in other Government Programmes as well. Since it is 
a rather new issue of political debate in this national scale, there have been no 
established ways of dealing with these arising needs for alignment of policy. In 
other fields of policy where the operations have more history and ways of working 
have remained the same throughout decades, less of these new cross-ministerial 
initiatives are pursued.  
 
In a more general scope, the development of rural areas is another topic around 
which the conversation of collaboration circles. The need for collaboration here is 
also rather explicit, as the geographical siloes are clearly visible and apparent to all. 
The trend of moving from local to regional development in many fields of policy 
has also speeded up the conversation of the need for collaboration. Municipal and 
regional cooperation is encouraged in most Government Programmes, but to 
which extent this actually is carried out in reality varies greatly. The OECD Study 
introduced earlier in this thesis stated the lack of horizontal collaboration in 
Finnish policymaking. This issue has been addressed in the Government 
Programmes, as the following excerpts show. The implementation of these 
intentions to practice seems to, however, lack in effectiveness. 
 
(21) ”Rural development calls for strong cross-sectorial regional development and 
industrial policy development work.” 
(Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen’s Cabinet 2011)  
 
(22) “The system of central government transfers to local government will 
be developed so as to promote reform of service structures and production methods, 
and to encourage intermunicipal cooperation.” 
(Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen’s Cabinet 2003) 
 
 (23) “A central part of the programme involves furthering regional collaboration 
 between the various authorities responsible for employment, as this will 
be necessary for operation of the proposed labor force development centers.” 
(Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen’s Cabinet 2003) 
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While these excerpts show how horizontal policymaking priorities are set within 
the Government Programmes, the steering systems and budget allocations are 
often seen to not sufficiently support collaboration in practice. (OECD Public 
Governance Reviews 2010) This lack of adequate resources to implement 
collaborative initiatives is often shown in the programmes as undetailed 
descriptions on how collaboration will be pursued in action. Many other objectives 
are described in plenty of detail, yet this seems to be a field too complicated for 
the Cabinet to get into. Ministerial siloes are so established that most members of 
administration do not see these barriers anymore, but are blindsighted by the 
prevailing customs of operation.  
 
 
7.6.2     Collaboration with the private sector 
The discourse of collaboration with private sector organizations is less present in 
the programmes. Mostly it occurs in connection to the privatization of municipal 
services, as the excerpts below illustrate. This trend of moving tasks formerly 
organized by the public sector for private sector companies to provide has 
accelerated during the time of the past few Cabinets. The adoption of managerial 
thinking in the search for efficiency suggests that the private sector is naturally 
more inclined to pursue efficient means of production, and that the public sector 
may thus gain savings by purchasing services from outside. The purchaser-
provider model, as the excerpt below states, is encouraged in most of the recent 
Government Programmes.  
 
(24) “The private and third sectors complement municipal services within the 
parameters permitted by law.” 
(Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen’s Cabinet 2011) 
 
(25) “The Government promotes partnerships between the  public, private and 
third sector in the provision of services. The adoption of the purchaser-provider 
model will be encouraged.” 
(Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen’s second Cabinet 2007) 
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In some instances, however, possibilities of collaboration are seen past this 
obvious trend of privatization. The excerpts below show rare examples of how 
private sector organizations are treated as experts in something the public sector 
does not yet sufficiently know how to do. The first excerpt discusses the 
collaboration in creating centers of strategic expertise to enhance innovation in 
Finland. The second illustrates how the private sector is seen to contribute to the 
promotion of Finland as an attractive target for capital investments. 
 
(26) “Within the scope of the centers of excellence strategy, strategic centers of 
expertise will be created in collaboration with the private sector, as outlined by the 
Science and Technology Policy Council.” 
(Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen’s second Cabinet 2007) 
 
(27) “Capital investments boosting the internationalization of the Finnish capital 
investment sector will be promoted in collaboration with companies operating in 
the sector and other investors.” 
(Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen’s Cabinet 2011) 
 
Other than in instances like these illustrated above, the private sector is not 
commonly addressed as a possible source of innovation regarding the public sector 
itself. No initiatives are made to involve the private sector into discussion of the 
future of our nation, or into developing solutions to the wicked problems we face. 
 
 
7.6.3     Collaboration with the civil society 
Collaboration with the civil society, consisting of the citizens and third sector 
organizations of Finland, has been on a rising trend in the Government 
Programmes. The programme of PM Holkeri’s Cabinet did not speak of working 
with the citizen at all, while the discourse of collaboration in the latest 
programmes was present in several occasions. Initiatives to engage the citizen into 
working together with the public sector have been increasingly common. There 
are, however, some inconsistencies visible that suggest the concept of an active 
civil society still remains non-familiar to the Government. 
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The citizens in most occasions are referred to as passive objects of action or 
consumers of services initiated by the government. Some programmes stated clearly 
that the government has an intention of involving citizens in decision-making, yet 
the phrase “designed for citizens” occurred consistently in all programs. The 
following excerpt from PM Vanhanen’s second Cabinet well illustrates how the 
power relations regarding the government itself and its citizens are regarded. The 
government is seen as superior to both citizens and companies in its ability to act 
upon them. The ‘information society’ mentioned below is also regarded a separate 
entity, the creating of which the citizens or companies are not involved in. 
 
(28) “The Government will boost the confidence of the citizens and companies in 
the daily services offered by the information society.” 
(Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen’s second Cabinet 2007) 
 
The same Government Programme does also explicitly recognize the need to 
empower citizens in collaborative production of services with the public sector. 
The excerpt on the following page regards the creation of welfare services. 
Questions related to social welfare and health are the most common in which the 
active participation of citizens is considered appropriate: the connection between 
service design and user-centricity here is recognized better than in many other 
contexts. This might be partly explained by the fact that the public services 
offered are more tangible in nature: everyone can recognize that providing health 
care is a service, where the patient is also involved in the production of the end 
result. This connection might not be as clear in talking of more abstract services 
such as building certain infrastructure. Where the citizen as an end user is 
perceived closest to the consumption of the service, initiated collaboration is most 
likely to occur. 
 
(29) “Citizens will be given improved opportunities to be involved in decision-
making and influence the type and quality of services provided.”  
(Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen’s second Cabinet 2007) 
 
Still, the opportunity to get involved in decision-making is seen as something that 
the Government can decide to give to its citizens, rather than something that 
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already belongs to them per se. The collaboration is also described as rather 
passive. The citizens are given the chance to influence decisions, but there is no 
implication that they would be actively involved in creating these services. No 
programmes mention the existence of citizen science or recognize that innovations 
regarding the work of the public sector may be born outside of the governance 
system itself. The perceived power position of civil society beneath the machine of 
public policymaking is implied in all programmes, despite their efforts to 
encourage the involvement of citizen. 
 
The later Government Programme of Jyrki Katainen’s Cabinet at times slips into 
a slightly patronizing tone of voice. Citizens in the following excerpt are seen as 
initially somewhat incapable or unwilling to care for their own well-being.  
 
(30)“Citizens are encouraged to behave responsibly with regard to their health 
by, for instance, the good practices generated by the Policy programme for health 
promotion.” 
(Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen’s Cabinet 2011) 
 
Third sector organizations as members of the civil society are very rarely 
mentioned in Government Programmes. When they are, they usually are treated 
in connection to private sector organizations: bundled together as “private and 
third sector” in sentences. Given their unalike nature and underlying motivations 
for their operations, third sector organizations should, in my opinion, be 
approached as part of the civil society rather than the private sector. The excerpt 
from PM Katainen’s programme below gives an example of how the civil society 
organizations are seen as collaborators in drafting new legislation.  
 
(31) “New anti-discrimination legislation that takes into account the 
European legislative developments and that effectively guarantees equality 
regardless of the discrimination grounds will be drafted in collaboration with 
social partners and civil society organizations and be submitted to Parliament.” 
(Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen’s Cabinet 2011) 
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7.7     Nurturing innovation and experimentation 
The discourse of innovation in the Government Programmes has grown steadily 
over the past decades. Especially since the second Cabinet of PM Vanhanen, 
enhancing innovation capabilities has been actively present in all programmes. 
The responsibility of generating innovation can be seen to divide so that the 
public sector finances research and development, while the private sector and 
higher education are expected to produce outcomes. The ‘strategic inputs’ of 
Government mentioned in the first excerpt below mainly refer to funding R&D 
activities in the private sector as well as universities. 
 
(32) “The Government is willing to strengthen the economy’s capacity for 
innovation by providing strategic inputs in selected areas, to foster the 
development of expertise and improve the conditions for creating and expanding 
new risk-bearing businesses.” 
(Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen’s second Cabinet 2007) 
 
(33) “An adequate level of funding for research, development and innovation 
activity will be secured. During this parliamentary term, the targeted share of 
RDI expenditure is 4% of GDP.” 
(Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen’s Cabinet 2011) 
 
Ensuring financial support for innovation seems to be the main concern of 
Government Programmes: not many other means of supporting innovativeness 
are mentioned. Some programmes do suggest the formation of ‘centers of 
expertise’, like mentioned in the above excerpt. There are, however, no further 
explanation to what is meant by these expertise hubs. The programmes of PM 
Katainen’s Cabinet and the current Cabinet of PM Sipilä put more emphasis on 
the creation of innovation hubs and networks, as the following excerpts show. 
There seems to be, at least to some extent, an understanding of the possible 
benefits of innovation networks. Still, the programmes do not specify on who is 
seen as part of these networks or if the innovations generated will affect the public 
sector itself. 
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(34) “In addition to nationally and regionally networked innovation 
communities, strong regional hubs of innovation will be created in Finland. The 
innovation policy will support the rest of the R&D policy for its part.” 
(Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen’s Cabinet 2011) 
 
(35) “Regional centers of excellence and powerful hubs representing specific fields 
will be provided with financial support.” 
(Prime Minister Juha Sipilä’s Cabinet 2015) 
 
The development of innovation policies for various sectors of the economy is also 
seen as an important channel to enforce innovation activities, as the following 
excerpt illustrates.   
 
(36)“Energy technology is a growth sector, the growth of which is supported 
by means of innovation policy, research and product development and training.” 
(Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen’s Cabinet 2011) 
 
The Government Programmes do not elaborate on how innovations by their 
opinion are generated, or what else besides expertise and finances are needed. The 
current programme of PM Sipilä’s Cabinet does, however, recognize that the 
conversion of expertise to innovation is not always straightforward:  
 
(37) “Expertise is not being converted into innovations, innovations are not 
commercialized. We are losing our expertise-based competitive edge.” 
(Prime Minister Juha Sipilä’s Cabinet 2015) 
 
The programme of PM Sipilä’s Cabinet is, indeed, the first to explicitly promote 
the mindset of experimentation within the public sector. The programme places 
emphasis on experiments in several connections: 
 
 (38) “Finland’s competitiveness is built on high expertise, sustainable 
development and open-minded innovations based on experimentation 
and digitalization.” 
(Prime Minister Juha Sipilä’s Cabinet 2015) 
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(39) “The Government will promote the creation and exploitation of service 
innovations based on a statutory framework that enables experimenting. The use 
of service initiatives will be facilitated as a fixed-term experiment.” 
(Prime Minister Juha Sipilä’s Cabinet 2015) 
 
This idea of prototyping and iterating within the public sector is rather radically 
new. Although the tone of voice is still focused on a forced consensus, this 
discourse of experimentation suggests that the mindset of top-down planning has 
begun to change towards a more network-oriented way of generating innovation. 
 
 
7.8     Promoting design methodology 
Closely related to the discourses of innovation, experimentation, and collaboration 
with the civil society, the discourse on design methodology has also increasingly 
been present within the last few programmes. Design as a field of expertise is, 
still, understood in the Government Programmes in its ‘traditional’ meanings, and 
mentioned in connection to conversations where it can be seen to indicate 
methods of industrial design in particular. 
 
The discourse on design in politics outside of the Government Programmes has 
been fortified by the introduction of the national design programmes since the 
second Cabinet of PM Lipponen. This discussion is not, however, visible in the 
programmes. The programme of PM Lipponen’s second Cabinet barely states 
that ‘the national design programme will be revised’. This statement is made in 
connection to policies of culture, which clearly reveals that the field of design and 
the value of design actions is not recognized outside of its traditional meanings. 
The latest programme of PM Sipilä’s Cabinet does not mention design at all, 
while design thinking philosophy can be seen to some extent be implicit in the 
discourse of experimentation. Designers as professionals involved in the 
generation of innovation are not involved in any of the discourses of Government 
Programmes. 
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8     Conclusion 
This final chapter will gather the learnings of this thesis together, providing 
answers to the research questions asked in the very beginning of the study. The 
first section will conclude these key findings. The second section proposes 
contributions to literature and topics for future research, and the final section 
provides some managerial implications. 
 
 
8.1     Key findings 
The findings of this study are concluded in relation to each of the three research 
questions presented in the beginning of this study. The first question regarding 
the relevance of building strategic intent was answered through the context review 
and the online questionnaire. The second question of the key discourses of 
generating strategic intent was answered through examining existing literature. 
The final question of how these discourses are present in the Finnish Government 
Programmes was answered through the critical discourse analysis of these 
programmes and supported by literature. The response of this thesis to each 
question will next be summarized. 
 
 
9.1.1     Why is building strategic intent relevant for policymaking? 
In order to build a solid foundation for the closer examination of strategic intent 
in governance, the context review provided answers to assess the importance of 
building strategic intent for policymaking in the first place. This pursuit of intent 
was found out to originally stem from the search for sustainability. The context in 
which our public policymaking system acts can be characterized as wicked: the 
public sector has to continuously deal with increasingly complex challenges. These 
problems are intertwined and hard to distinguish from one another. They cannot 
be solved once and for all, but keep on manifesting themselves in changing forms 
when we aim to tackle them. (Rittel & Webber 1973; Levin et al. 2012) 
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These wicked problems require rather different methods of generating change 
than the traditional problem solving skills we have been taught. The study pointed 
out that understanding the social nature of policy issues is crucial in the search for 
ways to dealing with them. The ownership of wicked problems is not possessed by 
any actor alone, but these issues are dealt with by facilitating discussion on 
possible directions to take. (Horn & Weber 2007; Batie 2008) Since there are no 
specific end results to aim for, the process of dealing with wickedity is continuous 
and loaded with questions of values and opinions.  
 
To facilitate this discussion, design thinking and strategic design were in this 
study suggested to bring concrete tools for communicating implicit knowledge 
and emotions, where traditional research methods struggle with this plurality of 
objectives. (de Mozota & Kim 2009; Seidel 2000) The contributions of design 
methodology in connection to public strategy making are still hard to validate 
through empiric study, given the rather recent appearance of the discussion. 
However, this study found a strong link between the concepts of strategic design 
and strategic thinking in management literature (Liedtka 1998), where the 
grounds to make this statement are better established. Strategic design can also be 
seen to bring added value to the conversation by methods characteristically 
connected to design: prototyping, rapid iterations, and ‘soft’ methodologies 
aiming to hear the implicitly included information that is often left unnoticed.  
 
This thesis suggests that the key to systematically dealing with wicked problems is 
answering to them with wicked opportunities: pursuing structural innovation and 
embracing continuous change. Here, the methodologies of strategic design and 
strategic thinking are valuable. They provide a framework for routinely generating 
innovation, a skill the public sector is not exactly known for. (Kelley & Kelley 
2012) This principle of incrementally building radical innovation (Kemp et al. 
2005) constructs a sense of purpose for the operation of public sector 
organizations, by setting common long-term objectives to aim for. On the highest 
levels of public policymaking, a framework for managing these innovation 
activities is needed. Transition management provides one such viewpoint, 
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defining the process of structural innovation to form through backcasting midway 
objectives from a shared vision. (Rotmans et al. 2001; Kemp et al. 2005)  
 
This mutual vision and the motivation to aim for it were here found out to be 
equivalent to the concept of strategic intent introduced in management literature. 
Strategic intent is seen to create a common sense of direction and purpose for the 
actors involved in pursuing it. (Smith 1994; Hamel & Prahalad 1989) In the 
context of public decision-making, my suggestion was that these actors should 
involve the whole of government, the civil society and the public sector. This 
proposal is related to the idea of innovation networks. Research on wicked 
problems suggests, that the answer to tackling wickedity lies within collaborative 
actions — not in the mind of any single person, but in the social processes of 
creating and managing knowledge simultaneously on multiple levels and across 
horizontal siloes. (Rittel & Webber 1973) 
 
On this basis, the formation of strategic intent can be seen as a social process 
itself. Research on strategy making within management literature suggests, that 
this intent can be constructed through creating coherence between the multiple 
personal intents the actors possess. (Mantere & Sillince 2007) This is seen to 
happen through discursive practices in the social construction of meanings and 
purpose. These discourses of building strategic intent were the subject of my 
second research question, which will be next answered to.  
 
To summarize the answer to why building strategic intent is relevant to 
policymaking, this mutual pursuit of long-term objectives is crucial in building 
goal-directed and proactive government. It creates a shared sense of purpose, 
enabling the elimination of unnecessary hierarchies. Strategic intent was also 
found to open the way to creativity: the introduction of new disruptive ideas 
creates creative tension within the public sector, which must in turn be resolved by 
shaping the current reality towards that of the shared vision. (Senge 1997) 
Strategic intent is explicitly clear of the desired vision, but leaves room for 
multiple means to pursue them and for new ideas to emerge and shape the intent 
itself through time. 
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The importance of creating strategic intent for the public sector in Finland in 
particular was validated through an online questionnaire. The results suggested 
that the lack of mutual intent in policymaking manifests itself in the cacophony of 
conflicting instructions, the pursuit of personal interests over mutual agendas, and 
the existence of unnecessary bureaucracy. The respondents also brought out the 
important issues of a lack of possibilities to act in a future-oriented manner, the 
difficulty of generating change within the public sector, and the uncertainty 
caused by continuous organizational reforms. Instead of using resources to tackle 
real-life problems, they are spent to organize and re-organize again the rigid 
processes of policymaking. Strategic intent, when pursued at all levels of the 
policymaking network, eliminates the need for formal hierarchical structures and 
their maintenance. 
 
 
8.1.2     What are the key discourses of building strategic intent? 
How, then, might we pursue this strategic intent? As stated on the previous page, 
this study suggested that mutual intent is constructed through discourse involving 
all actors of the network. The adoption of the viewpoint of strategy-as-practice 
allows for the examination of strategic discursive practices as strategic decisions 
made by people in their social context. These discursive practices are seen to build 
and re-enforce power structures and initiate action. Strategic texts, as Vaara et al. 
(2010) suggested, also have textual agency: they achieve something by merely their 
existence. Studying the prevailing practices regarding the discourse of intentions is 
thus seen as an important aspect of creating strategic intent.  
 
This study followed the viewpoint of Mantere & Sillence (2007) in their 
classification of the discourses building strategic intent. These four discursive 
practices of (1) creating purpose, (2) building consistency, (3) acknowledging 
complexity and (4) emphasizing context were studied as the basis for the critical 
discourse analysis.  
 
Coherent strategic intent was found out to exist when the discursive practices of 
integration and differentiation are in balance. Practices of integration, namely 
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creating purpose and building consistency, were seen to make sense of the 
underlying logic for the multiple discourses of an organization, where propositions 
regarding strategy can be seen as related to each other. Practices of differentiation, 
such as acknowledging complexity and emphasizing context, in contrast, bring 
forward the local contexts and unique properties of decisions and actions. 
(Mantere & Sillince 2007; Jarzabkowski & Sillince 2007) This ideology of the 
practices of divergence and convergence occurring in turns were also examined in 
connection to the practices of a strategic thinker, and are familiar to many design 
practitioners through models such as the ‘double diamond’ (SEE Platform 
2013b). 
 
These discourses functioned as a loose framework for the empirical study. Their 
occurrence was analyzed throughout Government Programmes of Finland from 
the past lifetime of a generation.  
 
 
8.1.3     How are these discourses constructed within the Government 
             Programmes of Finland? 
The study examined the presence of these discursive practices of creating strategic 
intent within the Government Programmes of Finland. The source of material 
was chosen because it provides the only publicly open and documented medium of 
information regarding the strategic alignments of Finland as a nation. The 
Government Programmes were examined by the method of critical discourse 
analysis, where the four key discourses from literature and five discourses that 
emerged from the texts were analyzed. Attention was also paid to the overall style 
and tone of voice in the documents.  
 
The discourses of strategic intent were found to be rather modestly if at all present 
in the Government Programmes. Though the length of programmes within the 
past terms of office has significantly grown, a majority of these documents are 
tactical implementation guidelines and alignments. When considered in relation 
to the length of documents, the relative importance of the discourses of strategic 
intent may in fact be seen to have declined. Though our general understanding of 
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complexity and wicked problems has grown, this does not yet show in public 
policymaking, where traditions and established ways of operation have a strong 
foothold. The Government Programmes are characterized by a deontic and 
declarative tone of voice, and they mostly provide no argumentation to support 
claims. On the contrary, they seem to act as closure to the discussion, presenting a 
unanimous viewpoint and ready solutions.  
 
When considered in the larger political arena of public policymaking, the lack of 
these discourses in the programmes may be interpreted to purposefully maintain 
the power gap embedded deeply in the current decision-making system. If the 
concept of an active network of innovators stemming across the private sector, 
civil society, and all levels of government was seen as the preferred way of 
organizing decision-making power, more attention would be paid in opening up 
the reasoning logic behind decisions for others to question and build upon. As the 
statements in Government Programmes now are formulated, they leave a lot of 
implicit knowledge or thinking unsaid. 
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8.2     Contributions to literature 
This thesis has provided a rather broad and multidisciplinary viewpoint to the 
problematic nature of policymaking and the pursuit of sustainability. By 
combining existing research from the fields of social sciences, management 
studies, political sciences and design research among others, I have suggested 
several new perspectives into collectively dealing with the interconnected issues we 
call wicked problems.  
 
The discussion of strategic design and design for government has struggled with 
the lack of sufficient empirical evidence of the benefits of involving design actions 
in public policymaking procedures. This thesis has suggested a clear link between 
the fields of design and management studies, where the empirical research on the 
merits of strategic thinking are more established. The connection between 
strategic design and strategic thinking is here suggested to be strong, while design 
methodologies may indeed add to the benefits of strategic thinking. This 
connection is suggested as a topic for further exploration within the field of design 
research. Validating the connection through empirical research would provide a 
valuable opportunity for design practitioners to rationalize their involvement in 
the public sector in a way familiar to policymakers. 
 
Another contribution of this study to literature is the suggested link between 
transition management and strategic intent. The field of transition management, 
like that of strategic design, is relatively new. It is also rather disconnected from 
the discourses of other fields of science, and would thus benefit from building 
some connections to more established viewpoints. Research on strategic intent 
and its pursuit are quite popular in the connection to private sector organizations, 
but recently have also been studied in the context of public management. 
Understanding the connection of strategic intent and the transition vision and 
objectives mentioned in transition management would be an interesting viewpoint 
for further studies, and may assist in the diffusion of transition management as a 
framework to guide large systems towards sustainability. 
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A third proposed contribution to literature is the link I have drawn between 
design methodologies and transition management (see Figure 13 below for 
illustration). The core idea transition management presents of forming a vision of 
the future, backcasting agendas for change, and iterating between these forward- 
and backwards-looking actions, is close to the nature of design methodologies. I 
suggest that combining these two viewpoints would present exciting opportunities 
for design professionals to get involved in strategic level decision-making. 
Understanding the benefits that design methods may bring to the rapid iteration 
and pursuit of continuous innovation is an important step in integrating these 
creative viewpoints into public management. 
 
 
 
Figure 13: The proposed connection between transition management and design methodologies. 
Adapted from Rotmans et al. 2001 
 
1. The formulation 
of a transition 
vision (strategic 
intent) 
2. The identification 
of change agendas 
3. The pursuit of 
radical incremental 
innovation 
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8.3     Managerial implications 
The implications of this thesis to managers in the public sector and those outside 
of it willing to contribute to policymaking can be described as two-fold. Firstly, 
recognizing the wicked nature of most real-world problems is crucial in finding 
successful means to dealing with them. Creating wicked opportunities by 
nurturing innovation activities is the only way to proactively create the future 
instead of merely trying to cope with the increasingly complex and interconnected 
problems we face. The public sector has had difficulties in finding balance 
between its exploitative and explorative actions: it seems like experiencing 
continuous change has initiated a counter-reaction and lead to tighter control in 
some areas of policy. A more productive reaction, as this thesis suggests, would be 
to let go of control and enable the larger network of government as well as the 
civil society and the private sector to search for solutions together. 
 
Secondly, the ways in which we create discussion of these issues is extremely 
important. Strategic intent for Finland, i.e. the mutual long-term vision to pursue, 
is seen to construct within the discourses of public strategy. Currently the ways in 
which strategic issues are publicly communicated do not support the building of a 
shared sense of purpose. More attention should be paid to the rhetoric means and 
discursive practices of public strategy making, in order to create consensus on the 
long-term goals of sustainable development. All reforms and policy changes can 
be claimed redundant, if there is no collective vision of a desired future to pursue.  
 
The suggested discourses of creating strategic intent should be considered as 
guidelines for communicating in matters related to strategy in the public sector. 
These discourses should be paid special attention to in the preparation of 
Government Programmes, since their role as the overarching strategy document 
of the whole of nation is unique. Taking the suggestions of OHRA Project 
further, I claim that the nature of Government Programmes in the future should 
be clearly more strategic and future-oriented, and that the action plan for 
implementation could, in fact, be assembled by the larger policymaking network 
in true collaboration. 
 
 113 
These collaborative practices of creating strategic intent should be supported by 
the methods of strategic thinking and strategic design. Design professionals 
should pay attention to finding ways to better communicate the benefits of 
establishing design methods as part of policymaking. In this pursuit, they should 
not stick to speaking of design alone, but combine knowledge from more 
established theories as well. Explicitly recognizing that many practices of design 
are in fact adapted from other fields of science may help in finding new arguments 
for embedding design into the formation of strategy in the public sector. Instead 
of always focusing on what is new or better in design methodologies, practitioners 
should also reflect on what is commonly known in public management and how 
design could contribute to these existing practices. 
 
One clear way in which design methods may contribute to the pursuit of public 
strategic intent is by being an active participant of sense-making activities. Visual 
and tangible ways of communicating abstract entities is design’s forte and a skill in 
which the government lacks. User-centered methods are currently increasingly 
utilized in connection to city planning and local policymaking, but the 
opportunities of these to be involved in higher levels of decision-making should 
be actively searched for. Creating ways of meaningful dialogue between all 
participants of the innovation network requires design capabilities also in the 
design of ‘meeting places’ for encounters to happen. 
 
To conclude, the implications of this study to the development of public 
policymaking are that all participants of public innovation networks should aim in 
their actions for the common long-term intents shared and re-generated in the 
network. The aspirations of a sustainable future are realized only by building 
discourses and thus actions to support the formation of mutual strategic intent. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1a: The online questionnaire statements and results in Finnish 
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Appendix 1b: Online questionnaire comments in their original language 
 
1) “Työpaikkani lähiyhteisö ja työntekijät ovat strategisesti taitavia. Sen sijaan 
johtamisessa on suuria ongelmia. Myös vallitseva suosikkijärjestelmä murentaa 
työn tuloksellisuutta, sen suuntaa ja strategian onnistumista: yksi saa tehdä mitä 
huvittaa yhteisen työn kustannuksella.” 
 
2) “Vaikka oman toiminnan tulevaisuuden vaikutukset näkee, ei kaikilla ole 
käytännön mahdollisuutta tuoda näkemyksiään esille. Huonosti 
tulevaisuusorientoitunut virasto tappaa tulevaisuusorientoituneiden henkilöiden 
halun tuoda näkemyksiään esille.” 
 
3) “Suomessa ei osata johtaa tavoitteellisesti. On myös hyviä johtajia tosin. 
Suomalaiseen julkiseen hallintoon kuuluu eräänlainen virkamiesten autonomia ja 
luottamus, jolloin muutos on vaikea saada aikaiseksi. Jos vertaa julkista ja 
yksityistä sektoria, julkisen työn tuotteettomuus johtaa tavoitteiden puuttumiseen 
ja tätä kautta tehottomuuteen. Samalla julkisella sektorilla arvostetaan ihmisten 
osaamista ja sen kehittämistä.” 
 
4) “Tunteet ovat tällä hetkellä ristiriitaiset, uudistuksia tehdään kaavioina ja 
johtajien persoonien mukaan, ei palvelunsaajien eli asiakkaiden eli kansalaisten 
tarpeista.” 
 
5) “Hankkeistaminen ja projektirahoitteisuus on mennyt liian pitkälle. 
Hankesälän pyörittämisen sijaan pitäisi hakea jatkuvuutta. Toinen kriittinen 
asia on jatkuvat organisaatiomuutokset. Näiden aiheuttamia kuluja ei huomioida, 
samalla kun aikaansaadut hyödyt saattavat jäädä vähäisiksi. Kannattaako 
rakenteiden mylläämiseen laittaa näin paljon rahaa. Kehitetään enemminkin 
sisältöjä.” 
 
 
